


THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin



Vol. XXXVII, No. 949

September 2, 1957

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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President Eisenhower Expresses Concern Over Mutual Security Cuts

Following is the transcript of President Eisenhower's impromptu press conference of August 14 as released by the White House on that date, together with a statement read to news correspondents on August 15 by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PRESS AND RADIO CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 14

THE PRESIDENT: I think, ladies and gentlemen, that this is the first time I have asked you into an impromptu press conference. But I have called you in because I have just signed two documents that I believe will be of the utmost importance to the security and the prosperity and peace of the United States.

They are the Mutual Security Authorization Act and then my official request upon the Congress for the appropriations to implement.

Now the authorization is for approximately three and four-tenths billion dollars. This is a half-billion less than that which I requested last May.¹ The amount, therefore, that is on the appropriation request is exactly that, three and four-tenths minus billion, because I am prohibited by law from asking for more.

Now I signed this with really the prayerful hope that we may be able, with that Act, to sustain the essential interests of the United States in the free world, but there is no disguising the fact that the effects will be serious. Nevertheless, we can hope that we will do well enough so that the calling of the Congress in extraordinary session will not be necessary.

Now let's take a brief look at the history of this Mutual Security.

¹ For text of the President's message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for 1958, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1957, p. 920.

It started in 1947 and since that time there have been many points in the free world that have been transformed from positions of weakness and threat into positions of real strength for the free world.

Greece and Turkey started it. Yugoslavia, breaking away from the overlordship of Moscow. Iran in 1953. Then Vietnam a little later. And finally a stronger and better position in the Middle East.

Now in that period—1947 to the present—the United States has put into the defense part of our Mutual Security about 17 billion dollars. Our allies have put 107 billion dollars. This means that for all of the money we have put in, there have been hundreds and thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen supported that we could otherwise have not supported at all on the side of the free world.

Incidentally, the cost of a division in almost any other country in the world is just a fraction of what it costs to sustain an American division either here or abroad.

Now certain of these countries that are on the outposts of the free world and right up against the Eurasian land mass are now absorbing about three-quarters of what we call the total of our defense supports. These are Korea, Formosa, Vietnam, Turkey and Greece.

Let's consider Korea for a moment. In Korea we have got invested 135 thousand American casualties. Now I believe that under the circumstances existing at the time that war began, the war was necessary. Those casualties were required from us in order to support our security in the world and to stand firmly behind the cause of freedom.

But my question is now: Are we going to nullify all those sacrifices by failing to recognize the position of Korea facing a long battlefront of 155 miles

and without adequate support from us? Those countries are poor economically and financially, but they are strong in courage, and by helping them we certainly help ourselves.

Now in Korea alone we put 840 million dollars, or something of that nature. We have of course been struggling to help them get a position where we can lower these costs. All over the world we have sought places where we can make savings. But as I told you, Korea cannot support the kind of forces necessary, unless we help them with money. And we have as you know, only a very small portion of the soldiers in Korea we once had.

In the authorization bill, also, there is a development fund project which allows us to transform our economic help largely from the grant basis to the loan basis, something which every committee that has studied this problem recommends strongly.

I most earnestly hope that the Congress will support this particular part of the bill to the full.

Now let us remember, mutual aid has no special pressure group supporting it. There is no particular organization in America that is making a living out of supporting Mutual Security. This is merely a case where the welfare of all of us is involved—every single one of us, and our children.

So I think it becomes necessary for the President who does if nothing else try to represent—and it is his job to represent all of the people of the United States, to speak up in favor of what we are doing: a program that has been, on the whole, one of the most successful of any in which we have engaged; which confronts the communist menace with a unity of purpose and strength throughout the world. That is the kind of program that we are now talking about supporting properly, or weakening it.

I feel that America is not going to want to desert something that has been so laboriously and patiently built up over the past ten years by Americans of all parties, all races, all occupations. And I do not believe America is going to see it crumble through any false economy, or because it just has no local political impact.

Now of course this is not a regular press conference, and so in fairness to others, I would say let's don't go afield, but if there are any questions upon this particular subject, I would be glad—either with myself or my staff to try to answer.

Q. (Mr. Steele, Time Magazine) Mr. President, at one point in your statement you have given us, you referred to the hope that enough money would be appropriated this year to avoid the necessity of a special session of Congress—

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I said I hoped—

Q. (Mr. Steele) Yes sir.

THE PRESIDENT: —that we would get through with what we have been allowed, and I am hoping and praying that they give us what is now in the authorization bill, you see?

Q. (Mr. Steele) Yes sir.

THE PRESIDENT: I want that supported in full. With that money, I believe we have got a good chance to get through the year.

Q. (Mr. Steele) If such is not the case, if you don't get that money, may we assume you would not hesitate to—

THE PRESIDENT: I would have to. You cannot stand aside and see America's interest deteriorate throughout the world just by inaction.

Q. (Mr. Smith, UP) Well, can we harden that up a little, sir? Are you going to call a special session if they don't pass the appropriation?

THE PRESIDENT: No. This is what I am going to do. I am going to watch every single day what is developing in the world and whenever for lack of money the United States' interests become placed in real jeopardy, at that moment I would have no recourse except to call a special session.

Now I cannot say that if they take a ten-dollar bill out of this thing, that that's a special session. You can't be that arbitrary, much as you might like to make that as a statement, Merriman.

Q. (Mr. Lawrence, New York Times) Mr. President, referring to this conference you had the other night with the Democrats and the Republicans, I take it you made to them—

THE PRESIDENT: Exactly what I have said to you.

Q. (Mr. Lawrence)—the same sort of thing you have said to us? Now, what kind of response did you get? Was it an encouraging one?

THE PRESIDENT: I cannot tell you—I mean, I don't know, really—

Q. (Mr. Lawrence) No commitments?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there were no commitments of any kind. There never are at any of those meetings, Bill. Just a question of I lay out before them what I believe. I lay it out strongly. As a matter of fact, I think I laid it out more strongly than I have here, but it was a longer conference—I suppose an hour and a half, hitting back and forth.

And of course, people can call your attention to places where there has been malfunctioning of administrative offices, where there has been some waste. Of course there is. We are human.

But the fact is: Here is the cheapest money we spend, as long as we are talking about getting security for the United States. If we did not have this working effectively, I just would hate to guess what would be the sums I would have to ask in the defense appropriation next year.

Q. (Mr. Burd, Chicago Tribune) Mr. President, did you tell the leaders the other night the same thing that you told us, about the possibility of calling them back into session?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think probably only in a more negative way. I said that of course none of us would like to see the necessity—the need for a special session of Congress.

Q. (Mr. Burd) You did raise that possibility—

THE PRESIDENT: I mention this every time I talk about this particular problem. However, as you people well know, I don't think that any of you ought to interpret anything I say in terms of a threat of any kind. I never make them. It's a matter of what the necessities of the moment demand.

Any others? Well, thank you for coming in.

Q. (Mr. Smith, UP) Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: As I say, this is a bit unusual. Good to see you.

STATEMENT BY MR. HAGERTY

White House press release dated August 15

The President said yesterday that the cuts already made in the authorization bill were of such a nature as to hamper programs designed for the best interests of the United States and the free world.

Here is how the President views the additional cuts made by the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee:

(1) The cut in military assistance is very deep and seems unjustified in extent. It will seriously delay modernization of the free world's forces in the face of progressively improved Communist forces.

(2) The cut in defense support will compel, almost certainly, dangerous reductions in the size and effectiveness of the forces now being maintained by free nations bordering on Communist lands. Additionally it will lead to serious difficulty in the economies of those nations supporting such forces.

(3) The cut in the development loan fund—a 40 percent cut—makes impossible the realization of the important purpose for which this fund was established by the Congress.

(4) The cut in technical assistance will make it difficult to assist our friends, particularly those newly independent nations who have turned to the United States for help in helping themselves.

(5) The cut in the special assistance fund will not only seriously affect the funds for such programs as the worldwide effort to eradicate malaria and to aid Hungarian refugees but it will also seriously reduce the reserve funds hitherto provided to the President to meet emergencies which inevitably develop in the world we live in today.

The President is gravely concerned over these cuts. In the conviction that the national interests of this country are deeply involved, he sincerely hopes that final congressional action will restore the amounts to those authorized by the Congress yesterday.

The Moral Element in Foreign Policy

by Livingston T. Merchant
Ambassador to Canada¹

Foreign policy is a complex and confusing subject. Although foreign policy, like the weather, is a popular topic of conversation, what it is and what goes into its construction are, I think, little understood. What is foreign policy? Foreign policy, it seems to me, is the sum total of a country's expressed attitudes and actions toward other countries. Its purpose is to support certain national objectives. There is certainly nothing to be surprised at in the fact that any country's foreign policy is designed to protect that country's vital interests.

The foreign policy of Moses, I suppose, was to insure that he safely got the Children of Israel out of Egypt and to the Promised Land, where they could, by force or negotiation, establish themselves in freedom and security. The foreign policy of Napoleon was to win the hegemony of Europe and to destroy England's capacity to threaten his expanded empire. The foreign policy of the United States has been consistently designed to achieve our national objective of living under our own institutions, with full scope for our individual creative capacities in a prosperous world under a durable and just peace.

So much for a brief definition of foreign policy and its purposes.

Next we should identify the basic elements which govern and influence the formulation of foreign policy in general. While most or all of the elements I mention will be taken into account in the formulation of a particular country's foreign policy at a particular time in history, these various elements are given different weights and

values. These elements, I believe, fall into three rather different categories.

The first set of factors are physical or material. They relate to force and power. Force, Webster says, is "strength or energy; vigor." Power, again according to Webster, is "the ability to act; capacity for action" as in the sentence, "to have the power but not the will to work."

It is tragic but true that these physical or material elements add up to the capacity to fight a war. Clausewitz wrote in his supreme cynicism, "War is the ultimate extension of national policy." Admiral Mahan described the purpose of force in terms more acceptable to Americans when he said, "Its purpose is to provide a shield behind which moral ideas can grow."

Whether one looks at warmaking potential as designed for aggression—forcibly to impose one nation's will on another—or for defense—to prevent another nation from forcibly imposing its own will—the fact is that throughout history to the present day the capacity—in *extremis*—to resort to war and the magnitude of that capacity relative to a country's neighbors are inescapable and powerful influences in shaping a particular country's foreign policy.

Unhappily, the use of force or the threat of its use has not been banished from our present world. A foreign policy based on the assumed absence of force merely exposes a nation adopting such a policy to the risk of annihilation or subjugation as long as there exist powerful and predatory nations whose actions are uncontrolled by any moral standard. Mass nonresistance or hunger strikes will not conduce a pacific response in nations whose actions are based on jungle law.

¹ Address made at the Lake Placid Club Summer Symposium at Lake Placid, N. Y., on Aug. 8.

They merely increase the risk for the victim and hasten his end.

Next, my thought is to suggest some intangible elements which to greater or lesser degree influence a country's foreign policy. I am thinking of such factors as language and racial origins and culture.

Then, third, there is the moral element. By this I mean the practice, not merely the profession, of behaving in accordance with established principles of right and wrong.

Physical Factors in Foreign Policy

Now let us examine more closely the purely physical factors which mold any country's foreign policy.

First is geography—the physical location of a country; the character of its terrain; the physical nature of its frontiers; the nearby presence or remoteness of other powerful nations and their size, power, and configuration. All this is an element in the fabrication of foreign policy. Switzerland's neutrality, now well in its second century, could never have been a supportable and successful foreign policy of that country had it not been for the defensive strength of the Alps.

The United States could never have pursued for substantially the first century and a half of its national existence a policy of isolation had it not been for the fact that its eastern and western frontiers were anchored on broad oceans and its northern and southern neighbors posed no significant military threat to the continuation of its inward-looking process of developing the better part of a continent. A small country with a strategically vulnerable border to a more powerful neighbor would find limits imposed on its foreign policy attitudes which, except in the interests of national survival, it might not otherwise choose. So one can see that geography and one's neighbors play an important role or, to put it another way, impose limits, on the basic foreign policy of any particular country.

Another powerful material element in foreign policy is economics. The scarcity or abundance of food—to look at the most elemental economic factor—within the boundaries of a particular country plays a significant role in determining a country's foreign policy. Just as the oceans and pacific neighbors permitted an isolationist foreign

policy for the United States over many decades, so also was this policy reinforced by the circumstance that we grow more than enough food for our population. British foreign policy in the 19th century, with its emphasis on ruling the oceans and opening up underdeveloped areas, had direct root in the dependence of England on overseas sources for much of its food and the absence of any raw materials other than coal for its burgeoning industry.

Another important factor is the size of a country's population and the degree of productive skill they possess. Climate helps to govern human productivity. The availability of capital will determine the magnitude and character of a nation's physical productive plant. And in the modern world such productive indices as millions of tons of steel turned out per year reflect the backbone of power.

The Intangible Elements

Now for the intangible elements which I mentioned some moments ago. What are these? Religion and ideas play an important part in determining foreign policy. Take, for example, the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries which tortured Europe. Go back further and consider the foreign policy of the Mohammedan Arabs who burst out of the Arabian peninsula in the 7th century, partly for economic reasons but mostly, I am sure all historians will agree, for religious reasons—the propagation and spreading of the Islamic faith. That tide of tough warriors, sustained by the promise of their religion that Paradise awaited the dead warrior, swept across the south Mediterranean littoral. That tide lapped halfway through Christian Europe before it was stopped at Tours and gradually pushed back mile by mile over more than two centuries to North Africa. In 17th century England, though it was civil war, religious elements were originally dominant in Cromwell and his Roundheads' war against the two King Charleses.

Revolutionary ideas can similarly dominate a foreign policy. The revolutionary armies of the French Revolution under the Directorate were seeking to spread to all of Europe the revolutionary philosophy of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Then, dynastic relationships and royal intermarriages have helped to shape a country's

foreign policy. Both are out of fashion today. They have, however, been powerful in the past. To some extent I think they may have been replaced by cultural ties or by common religious belief. In a military sense such ties have been reinforced in present times by collective-security treaties. Certainly the common heritages and historic relationships of the nations composing the Atlantic Community made possible the North Atlantic Treaty.

Now all of these elements—geography; population, its size and character; economic factors; religious faith; philosophical concepts; the physical character of frontiers; the possession of adequate food and raw materials; even climate; the state of its science; and the size of its industrial plant; and, of course, the vigor and unity of the men, women, and children—who, in the last analysis, compose a state—all these and many other less important factors in sum total constitute the power of a nation.

The Role of Morality

We have now to consider the moral element. In simplest terms, for us, it means acting in our foreign relations as the Christian faith teaches us to behave in our private lives. I firmly believe this element is and always has been present in our own foreign policies.

But this element is not present in the foreign policies of all countries in the world today. Let us look at two recent world events to find striking illustrations of morality, and its absence, in foreign policy. I think of the events of last fall in Suez and Hungary.

In both episodes the United Nations faithfully reflected in its majority votes the aroused conscience of the world. By overwhelming votes in separate actions it called for the prompt withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and from Hungary. Never were morality in the one case and the absence of morality in foreign policy in the other case better demonstrated than in the prompt affirmative response by Britain and France to the appeal of the United Nations and the total, cynical, and contemptuous disregard by the Soviet Union of a similar call by the United Nations with respect to Hungary.

The United States was in the forefront of the debates in the United Nations on these two separate actions. We determined our actions on

grounds of principle—of morality. As President Eisenhower told the Nation on October 31 in the midst of that dual crisis, "There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."

The Suez Incident

Let me briefly recall the incident of Suez. We in the United States quite generally thought that our oldest friends and oldest allies, Great Britain and France, made a mistake when they moved militarily into the Suez Canal Zone last fall. We did not disguise that feeling.

It is not, however, my purpose to dwell on that point. Certainly our friends acted under extreme provocation and in intimate knowledge of the fact that their national livelihood and very existence depended on the oil of the Middle East delivered to Europe by the short route through the canal. Apparently they thought—wrongly, I believe—that the United States was indifferent or at least imperfectly aware of their situation. But for anyone to accuse the British and French of having cynically sought to establish a new empire or colonial area in Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East is utter and complete nonsense.

In any event, our allies acted, and much of the rest of the world reacted with equal promptness—the Soviets by ominous threats; the majority of the United Nations with a call for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the French and British troops at the very moment when they seemed to have their limited objectives in sight.

It is to the everlasting credit of those two great countries and their attachment to moral principle that they responded immediately to that call.

The Case of Hungary

Now let us turn to the tragic case of Hungary—to the savage brutality of the Russians and the absence of any moral standard where the Soviets and their cohorts are concerned.

Last October the incredibly brave Hungarian people decided spontaneously and almost unanimously that they had had enough of domestic terror and oppression and of Russian domination of their national life. Unarmed they rose. When hit by force, they fought back with amaz-

ing courage. And we should mark the fact that students, workers, farmers, and intellectuals of Hungary all were in the ranks of the freedom fighters. These were the very people for whose allegiance the Communists had devoted their greatest efforts.

For a short time it seemed that the miracle had happened and that the Hungarian people had gained by their sacrifices a very large measure of independence for their national existence. Then, by deceit, treachery, and overwhelming armored force brought in from outside Hungary, the Red Russian Army gained the upper hand.

The Soviet leaders had reverted to type. They reacted in Hungary as a challenged despotism based on force and terror, uncontrolled by a parliament, by domestic opinion, or by the restraints of religion.

All the free world watched this tragedy in horror and anguish. The weapon of moral condemnation was the only alternative to action which might well bring on a third world war. The United Nations instinctively responded to the outraged conscience of the free world. The United Nations called on Russia to withdraw its troops from Hungary. The Soviets refused. Speaker after speaker in the United Nations denounced in horror Russian brutality and shameless oppression in Hungary. In December the General Assembly of the United Nations formally condemned the Soviet Union for violation of the United Nations Charter. And there seemed little else they could do, other than send in medical supplies and provide new homes abroad for the refugees who fled the terror in Hungary.

This has been so far a dark and depressing chapter. I submit, however, that its end has not yet been written. I firmly believe that any government, however ruthless and authoritarian, which aspires to a role of influence and leadership in the world cannot disregard what I have termed the moral element. It must show what Jefferson called "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." In part, its adjustment to such pressures may be only outward and slow in coming. "Hypocrisy is the tribute paid by vice to virtue." In the long run, I am satisfied, conform it must.

I am equally satisfied that, had not the United Nations reacted promptly and vigorously, the actions of the Soviets would have been even more brutal, if not in Hungary, then certainly in Po-

land and elsewhere in the rumbling Soviet satellite empire.

And in the outside world, particularly among those billion or more human beings who count themselves "uncommitted," there has been a dreadful lesson learned. The Soviets for a time at least won the battle of Budapest. But I am as sure as I am standing here today that the Soviets have lost their campaign to dominate the world by methods short of total war. And surely the Russian military planners are now reassessing the reliability of all the satellite armies.

There is another lesson, I think, drawn for free men everywhere. This is that, when individual freedom and national independence have once been known, all the techniques of propaganda and indoctrination and "corrective" thinking cannot kill the flame of freedom in the breast of man and, moreover, that flame does not die with one generation. It can and is passed on to the next. This lesson which the Hungarians, at such tragic loss and suffering to themselves, have given to the world should do much in the months and years ahead to demolish the assumption that what the Communists once gain by force they will hold forever.

The Soviet Dilemma

We have learned other lessons in the past from the Soviets. Unhappily, it seems the world must learn some lessons over and over again. I think of the tragic fate of the Baltic peoples in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. They had a proud history, and they put their trust in Soviet good faith.

Let me read you a passage from a fascinating and revealing speech which Mr. Molotov delivered on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union before the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939. This passage relates to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As I read it, remember that this speech was delivered only one year before the Soviet Army moved in to incorporate by force into the Soviet Union these three independent states and to send eastward in cattle cars to Siberia tens upon tens of thousands of men, women, and children who had done no wrong other than to want to live in peace as citizens of independent sovereign states. This is the passage:

Our recent diplomatic negotiations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have shown that we have sufficient confidence in each other and a proper understanding of the need for these measures of military defense in the interests both of the Soviet Union and of these states themselves. The negotiations have fully revealed the anxiety of the parties concerned to preserve peace and to safeguard the security of our peoples who are engaged in peaceful labor. All this ensured a successful issue to the negotiations and the conclusion of pacts of mutual assistance which are of great historical importance.

The special character of those mutual assistance pacts in no way implies any interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. On the contrary, all these pacts of mutual assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of the signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs. These pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social and economic structure of the contracting parties, and are designed to strengthen the basis for peaceful and neighborly cooperation between our peoples. We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

Twelve months later the cattle trains moved east from these three little Baltic countries.

The Soviet leaders have been pinned under the spotlight of the moral judgment of the world. The dilemma they face is for them a hard one. They must respond to this moral judgment in increasing degree or forfeit the influence they covet to exert in much of the world. Possibly some countries in the Middle East or elsewhere had forgotten the tragic lesson of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Surely, however, the lesson of Budapest will give them pause.

I repeat, I believe last fall in Hungary the Soviets won a temporary victory but they lost, in the long run, their campaign for the world. They will lose it because there is godlessness in their foreign policy.

Realism and Idealism

I believe, as I have said earlier, that basic United States foreign policy, today as in the past, gives constant and powerful weight to the moral element. This springs, I am sure, out of our heritage from western Christendom and out of the fact that we have been from the days of the Pilgrims not only a Christian nation but a deeply religious one. Approximately two-thirds of our popula-

tion are churchgoing members of our churches. So our tradition and our present practice incline us to the Christian faith and ethic. And since in the long run, in the historical sense, no foreign policy can be long maintained without the support of the people, it is natural and understandable that all our major foreign policies bear the imprint of the Christian ethic.

A durable and successful foreign policy, in the sense of achieving such elemental national objectives as assuring the survival of our country, must not merely reflect elevated morals. It must also be in harmony with the hard, cold realities of the world around us. What I am trying to say is that foreign policy must be hardheadedly realistic in assessing our own power and the external power which might be arrayed against us. It must also, however, contain the element of morality which reflects our ideals and our pervasive national sense that certain things and attitudes and actions are right and others are wrong. We must combine hard-boiled realism with idealism. I think this is the case today. I think, moreover, that it has been the case in the past, and I pray God that it always will be in the future. If we, the people of the United States, fail to insist on the marriage in our foreign policy of practicality and idealism, then our foreign policy will fail and our Republic be placed in jeopardy.

To illustrate this point, let me take three examples of fundamental foreign policies of the United States which have proved durable over decades and truly reflective, I believe, of what we are. In each case we can trace the combination of a clear-sighted recognition of the strategic necessities for our national security and of Christian impulses or beliefs.

First and oldest, of course, is the Monroe Doctrine—150 years old. What really was this Doctrine? It seems to me it said two things. First, that the United States could not tolerate, in the interest of its national security, the establishment of a beachhead by a formidable European military power in the hemisphere south of us. Secondly, it said that we openly sympathized with the desire of any people to be free, provided they were capable of self-government and determined to defend their independence. We were therefore prepared physically to repel any effort to fasten foreign domination on the fledgling republics to the south. Here was a union of the hardheaded

recognition of power factors and an effective expression of our ideals.

My second example is the so-called Open Door Policy with respect to China. It was an integral and important part of our foreign policy for over a century. What did it reflect? I think it reflected first the recognition that the United States as a country bordering on the Pacific could not for reasons of its own national security afford to see the mainland and the outlying peninsula and island possessions on the far shore of the Pacific Ocean lodged in hostile and powerful hands. By the Open Door Policy we attempted to insure that no one power—and the threat then was mainly European—should dominate China and ultimately be in a position to dominate the strategic offshore positions. This policy, at the time, was wrongly criticized as merely cloaking commercial ambitions of the United States under the guise of idealism. But the policy had a large element of idealism which stemmed in good part from our missionary activities in China and all the Far East. We felt that we had a mission in that part of the world which was neither strategic nor commercial. It would be a great mistake to discount the force and the sincerity of such an ideal.

My last example is our European policy as it has grown and developed with postwar economic assistance programs of unprecedented magnitude and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. We in this country have felt for half a century—in part by instinct and in part by hardheaded examination of a world environment in which force must still be reckoned with—that we could not in our own national security interest see the mainland of Europe and its offshore island and peninsula positions dominated by a hostile despotism. We are an Atlantic power as well as a Pacific power, and the same strategic considerations apply to the far shores of both oceans. We fought in two world wars, both starting in Europe, to insure that we did not have to face that result. But in this case also there was more than realism or strategic thinking. There was a moral element. This was that the United States, with much of

its thought and law and institutions coming down from Greece and Rome through the great Christian countries of Europe and, above all, through Great Britain, could not in Christian decency see those independent and ancient citadels of our own national life and culture overpowered by hostile despotisms.

Now all three of these expressions of our foreign policy could only endure under the circumstances that each combined a practical assessment of the world around us with something more—call it idealism, call it a moral element, call it a deep devotion to Christ's teachings.

I read a few weeks ago a newspaper editorial which was scornful of our great Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. This editorial said that the trouble with Mr. Dulles was that he tried to be both a politician and a pillar of society. Now, if you accept the definition of politician in the true sense of the word, a practitioner of the art of political science, then I say that our Secretary of State is in fact trying to be a politician and a pillar of society at the same time and that that is exactly what the American people want a Secretary of State to be. We want a man who, against the background of a knowledge of history and of human nature, of peace and war, of economics and the dark forces which exist in the world today, possesses equally a profound conviction as to what is good and what is evil.

If we as a nation are not merely to survive but grow great and faithfully discharge the responsibilities which Providence has laid upon us, then we must of necessity formulate and support a foreign policy which recognizes all the elements which I have tried briefly to describe this evening: the purely physical, the intangible, and, last not least, the moral element. A hard head must be united with a soft heart. If we can keep this before us, then we can confidently believe that right as we know it will triumph. History and time and Christian teaching are on our side. These are allies that our adversaries can never rally to their side.

Canadian-American Cooperation

by John Wesley Jones

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

It is fitting indeed that the State of Maine, which in a very real sense is the gateway between Eastern Canada and the eastern seaboard of the United States, should be the locale for a Canadian Friendship Week. It is fitting also because the settlement of the Maine-Canadian border area by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 was one of the first and most important steps in the development of Canadian-American cooperation. It is a pleasure and an honor for me to be able to participate in these ceremonies on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles.

In a famous poem a century and a quarter ago Goethe wrote, "America—you are better off than our old continent. You have no ruined castles and your earth is wholesome. Your peace is not disturbed by useless memories and fruitless conflict."

One of the reasons why this poem still remains valid is that Canada is our neighbor to the north. Those of us who have lived for over a century free of the tensions of ancient border disputes and not threatened by a traditional enemy across the frontier can scarcely appreciate the importance of our relations with Canada. For you in Maine the names Fort Kent and Fort Fairfield represent busy communities in northern Aroostook County, not military installations directed against possible border invaders. It is not that we take this relationship for granted. It is rather so much a fact of life that we never focus our attention on it in a conscious manner. Like the air we breathe we

would notice it most if it were absent. For it is this century of peace that has permitted both our countries to develop in freedom and in security.

In this atmosphere our two countries have cooperated, not only in the economic field but also in the vital fields of political and defense matters. I would like this afternoon to touch briefly on some of these questions.

One of the great political facts of our times has been the cooperation between Canada and the United States in matters of continental defense. This fact is of considerable importance to the whole free world because it means that the United States and Canada, unconcerned with any danger on their common border, can concentrate their defensive efforts against a possible common enemy.

This cooperation began officially when a Permanent Joint United States-Canadian Board of Defense was established in 1940 to consider the problem of strengthening North American defenses.²

Even prior to the time the United States entered World War II the Board began examining means for cooperative defense of the North American Continent. Then, the important task was to defend the long sea frontiers which run along the coast of our two countries. Since the development of long-range aircraft, the possibility of an air attack across the North Pole area has become a much more real threat to our security and the need to defend this approach by cooperative effort has taken on much greater importance. Today, the early-warning system of the DEW Line, the Pine Tree Line, and the Mid-

¹ Address made before a joint meeting of service clubs at Portland, Maine, on the occasion of Canadian Friendship Day, Aug. 13 (press release 455 dated Aug. 12).

² BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1940, p. 154.

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Canada Line provide warning against aerial attack. To complement the warning system, the recently announced integrated air defense command of our two countries will provide for a coordinated effort to ward off that attack, should it ever occur.³ Both our Governments, of course, continue to hope that the Soviet Union will accept the proposals made at London on August 2⁴ by the United States, Canada, France, and Great Britain in the Disarmament Subcommittee for the inspection, under appropriate controls, of major zones of the world. Such acceptance would considerably reduce the danger of surprise attack. In the meantime, we must and shall continue to perfect our common defenses.

Working Together in U.N. and NATO

In international organizations we are, of course, in constant consultation with our Canadian friends. These consultations comprise a variety of avenues, both for bilateral talks and on a multilateral basis. The two principal international organizations in which we both are members are, of course, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, known as NATO. In both of these forums we exchange views and attempt to arrive at common positions. It is significant of the many things we have in common that with rare exceptions our policies are directed toward an identical goal.

In the United Nations Canada has consistently supported the provisions of the charter. It has repeatedly made significant contributions, both material and moral, to that organization. And I think it safe to say that, in that forum also, our relations have been characterized by reciprocal good will and mutual respect. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that we have achieved substantial agreement.

In NATO Canada has been a leader in extending the scope of NATO political and economic consultation and in expanding cooperation in cultural and information matters. Only last year the Canadian Minister of External Affairs was one of the "three wise men" of NATO whose report⁵ on the value of further extension of the activities

of NATO in other fields of mutual interest, as well as in the continued strengthening of military efforts for defense, was accepted by all member nations as guidance for NATO's future development.

Nor has Canada's contribution been solely political. On the contrary, Canada has made significant contributions and sacrifices by stationing Canadian ground and air forces in Europe as part of NATO's shield; by earmarking a substantial naval force for assignment to the allied Atlantic Command; and by rendering military assistance to our European partners to the extent of \$1.8 billion since NATO came into existence.

Bilaterally perhaps the most important regularly established bodies are the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, to which I have already referred, and the International Joint Commission. The Joint Commission was established by a treaty in 1909 to deal with problems of boundary waters and of waters flowing across our common borders. Since that time the International Joint Commission has considered and has helped to resolve over 70 cases referred to it by the two Governments. One of the happiest characteristics of the relationship between our two countries is that these cases, many of which could easily have given rise to bitter disputes and controversies, were settled by discussion, by negotiation, and by compromise. In addition to the above there are our special cooperative economic relations arising originally out of the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941.⁶ Under this relationship the two countries agreed to coordinate their economic efforts for the common defense. One of the latest formal manifestations of that cooperation was the establishment of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Problems.⁷ This Committee consists of four cabinet members from each country who meet, as required, to discuss major economic problems. Since it is now almost 2 years since the last session,⁸ the Committee plans to meet this fall, probably in October, in Washington.

We must not, however, forget the day-to-day consultations which constantly take place, both in Ottawa and in Washington. Dramatic as the more formal opportunities for consultation may be, it is

³ For text of a joint statement released at Washington and Ottawa on Aug. 1, see *ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1957, p. 306.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 303.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1957, p. 18.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1941, p. 494.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 739.

⁸ For text of joint communique, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 576.

these day-to-day contacts which are the lifeblood of diplomacy. They are responsible for the constant interchange of information, for the clarification of positions, and for the determination of common policies, without which international friendships cannot long survive.

Finally, there are those contacts between the two countries which are the greatest in scope and in many ways the most potent in effect. I am referring to the day-after-day encounters which take place between Canadian citizens and American citizens. I am talking about the tourists who travel north and south of the border by the thousands every year. I am talking about the businessmen who deal with their counterparts on an almost daily basis. I am talking about the goods that flow back and forth across the border and on which the stamp "made in Canada" or "made in USA" conveys a picture of the country concerned. I am talking, too, about the ideas and information, the newspapers, the magazines, the educators, the scientists, and all the others who contribute to this great intellectual cross-fertilization. Each of these people, when he crosses the border, becomes a living picture of his own country to those whom he encounters, and in a very real sense he deepens the understanding between the two peoples, both through what he contributes to the country he visits and through what he brings back to the country from which he came. Maine is an area in which these contacts are exemplified at their fullest and their best.

Economic Aspects of Cooperation

Since the economic aspects of our cooperation are of particular interest to businessmen, I would like to discuss them somewhat more fully. To begin with, trade between the United States and Canada is far greater than that between any other two countries in the world. It has increased ten-fold since 1935. It exceeds our total trade with all the countries of South America. It also exceeds our total trade with the entire continent of Europe. Each country is the other's best customer.

Canada is a major supplier of newsprint, nickel, aluminum, and asbestos. It is our second most important source of uranium. Canadian whisky is well known in the United States, and Canadian oil is becoming increasingly important to the United States economy.

The figures really speak for themselves. In 1956 the United States share in Canadian imports for consumption was 73 percent, as against 57 percent in 1935. At the same time United States purchases represented 59 percent of Canada's export of produce, or 23 percent higher than in 1935. The Canadian share in United States general imports is 23 percent, compared with only 14 percent in 1935. Canadian purchases in the United States have also risen from 14 percent of total U.S. exports to 21 percent of our export trade. In absolute figures, Canada exported goods to the amount of \$2.8 billion to the United States last year and imported goods valued at \$4.2 billion.

This difference of \$1.4 billion has been the source of some concern among our Canadian friends, and it would perhaps be well to look a little more closely at the components of our exports to Canada. A reasonable estimate would be that about one-third of these consist of capital equipment. A large part of this equipment is not paid for from Canadian dollar holdings but is purchased by American companies who then ship it to Canadian subsidiaries. Instead of being a drain on Canadian resources, this type of import actually adds to Canada's equipment pool. Moreover, by increasing Canadian productivity it tends to increase the wealth of the country. These imports of capital goods hold within themselves the promise of increasing production so as to establish in the future a merchandise balance at a higher level of total trade than that existing today.

In addition there are the purchases of capital goods by Canadian firms. While these are undoubtedly imports in that they must be paid for from Canadian resources, they also serve to increase the country's wealth by raising productivity.

I do not mean to imply that no problem of imbalance does exist. But I do say it is far less than the raw figures might lead one to believe.

Looking now at the importance of Canadian products for United States industry, it becomes apparent that many American industries, in the absence of imports from Canada, would practically have to shut down. As regards American newspapers, for instance, 5 million tons of standard newsprint were imported from Canada in 1953 compared with U.S. production of only 1 million tons. Our nickel and asbestos users would

be even worse off. In 1952 Canada's 100,000 tons of nickel exported to us compared with our production of 650 tons, and her 660,000-ton export of asbestos to us, with our output of 52,000 tons. These are merely a few outstanding examples of many raw and semimanufactured products for a substantial part of which we are dependent on Canada.

In terms of Canadian trade this means that Canada sells the U.S. over 80 percent of her total production of newsprint, over 60 percent of her total production of nickel, and about 70 percent of her asbestos production. Among other items, the United States buys over 80 percent of Canada's production of shingles and almost 80 percent of her wood veneers.

The United States sends Canada a more diversified range of products, generally more highly fabricated. Of these some of the most important are automobile parts, airplane parts, tractors and parts, iron and steel products, fuel oil, coal, and cotton. It will readily be observed that most of these represent manufactured or semimanufactured items, whereas our purchases from Canada are largely of raw or partly processed materials.

Protection and National Tariffs

This brings us to the problem of protection and of national tariffs.

Tariff barriers do not exist for a substantial portion of the present trade each way between the two countries. Of our imports from Canada in the past few years, some 55 to 60 percent were duty free. Of Canada's imports from us in the same period, about 40 percent were duty free. Our average rate on dutiable products from Canada is considerably lower than vice versa.

On the other hand, as I mentioned earlier, the bulk of our imports from Canada consist of a relatively few staple raw and semimanufactured products. On such trade the tariff is little or no obstacle. The place where our tariff pinches Canada is rather in nonstaple products, particularly manufactured, where the rate is high, sometimes prohibitive.

The Canadian tariff rates tend to cluster in a relatively narrow range and at a somewhat higher level than United States rates. This reflects obviously Canadian concern with the protection of its developing industry.

These economic problems can only be mentioned

in passing. Their solution will require thorough and expert study. Both Governments, of course, are in constant consultation on these and other problems, such as the simplification of customs regulations. Even more encouraging was the announcement on July 15 by the National Planning Association of the formation of a joint committee—not of Government officials, but of 40 prominent Canadian and American business, labor, and farm leaders—for the purpose of devoting itself to a factual study of the major problems facing our two countries. The value of such a group in developing international understanding is undeniable. If problems are to be resolved, they must first be understood. And if compromises are to be reached, they should ideally be based on a sympathetic approach to each other's problems. In the field of trade it is commendable that businessmen themselves are taking the initiative in seeking that approach.

Given these conditions, all available evidence indicates that the dynamic growth of our relationship will not only endure but will increase. As the growing population in the United States establishes new levels of demand, the market for Canadian goods is almost certain to expand with it. This in turn would naturally lead to increased Canadian purchases in the United States. Two commodities, for example, in which such developments are already in progress are iron ore and natural gas. There are huge reserves of iron ore in Canada which, in addition to supplying Canadian industry, supplement our own resources. Canadian natural-gas reserves have also proved to be extensive and might well be used to serve United States as well as Canadian communities. In fact, natural gas now moves in both directions across the border. Oil also travels this two-way street. There is an example of this in Portland in your Portland-to-Montreal pipeline.

Finally, I should like to mention the study group which is now considering the project of hydroelectric power from a Passamaquoddy Dam which offers such potential advantages for the State of Maine.

To sum up the economic picture I think it safe to say that under the leadership of forward-looking businessmen on both sides of the border and with the sympathetic support of enlightened administrations in each country there is at the present time every outlook for increases, both in trade and in investment, between our countries.

Foundations of Cooperation

We have explored here in some detail the many areas in which Canada and the United States cooperate. I think the next question that must occur to all of us is "Why?" There is nothing in international affairs that imposes cooperation between two countries if they do not wish themselves to take that road. It comes down to what is usually called, in the political science textbooks, "mutual self-interest" or, more recently, "enlightened self-interest."

The United States and Canada began their relationship under fortunate circumstances. Such feuds as there were from the Old World died out relatively early in our history, and there were neither economic nor population pressures to keep them going. Moreover, the circumstances of early life on our continent were not conducive to developing emotional patterns of distrust and dislike. We began therefore with a clean slate and could develop our cooperation without prejudice or preconceived notions.

This cooperation, may I add parenthetically, exists only partly because Canadians are "fellow North Americans." They are primarily Canadians, and they are as justly proud of their heritage and institutions and country as we are of ours. We are each of us devoted to our particular national characteristics. Each country is completely conscious of its own destiny. Happily, these are differences which do not separate us but, on the contrary, assure that we complement each other in the international scene.

A major interest for both countries is economic development. In countries such as ours, which have had a shortage of manpower as the chief economic factor through most of their histories, cooperation, if only on a local community basis, was an economic necessity. Today, when production in the United States has outstripped its natural resources in many cases and when the Canadian industrial potential is developing at an unprecedented rate, that cooperation remains as mutually beneficial as it has ever been in our history.

Then again there have been threats against our national security. Three times—in two world wars and in Korea—the United States and Canada have fought side by side in the interest of mutual defense and indeed of the whole free world. To-

day our countries are still faced with a grave threat to our security. And still today we are working together, with our other allies, to meet it and, if necessary, to defeat it.

None of these things is, however, the sole reason why we are able to work together as we do. In the last analysis it is a way of life—a Christian philosophy, if you like, common to the whole Western World—which permits this relationship.

Part of the greatness and durability of this concept derives from the fact that it can encompass differences of opinion without disintegrating. It is flexible enough to give free rein to the thoughts of all men who are dedicated to belief in freedom of the individual. The words "democracy" and "religion" help to describe this idea; the charter of the United Nations attempts to define its possibilities.

However we think of it, it is this idea of the spirit that holds together, not only Canadians and ourselves, but men and nations of good will the world over.

U.S. Replies to Canadian Note on Handling of Security Information

Press release 464 dated August 15

On August 13 Deputy Under Secretary Murphy handed the Canadian Ambassador, Norman Robertson, a United States note as an answer to the Canadian note of April 10, 1957, dealing with the handling of security information. An interim reply was handed to the former Canadian Ambassador, A. D. P. Heeney, on April 18.¹

Text of U.S. Note

APRIL 13, 1957

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's note No. 195 of April 10, 1957, which expresses the concern of the Canadian Government with reference to the handling of security information relating to Canadian citizens. The Department of State sent an interim reply to the Embassy on April 18, 1957.

The Embassy's note requests the cooperation of

¹ For a previous exchange of notes, see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1957, p. 694.

the United States Government in cases where the names of Canadian citizens appear in evidence before investigating committees. The view of your Government was made known to the appropriate members of the United States Congress, at which time the Department of State emphasized the great importance the United States attaches to maintaining the friendliest relations with the Government of Canada. I wish to assure you that this sentiment is wholeheartedly entertained by the Congress.

On a separate point your note requests that, in the reciprocal exchange of security information between agencies of the two governments, the United States Government give its assurance that none of its agencies or departments will pass such information concerning Canadian citizens, received from Canadian sources, to any committee, body or organization in the United States over which the Executive Branch of the United States has no control, without the express consent of the Canadian Government in each case. The procedures which have been followed by the security agencies of my Government in the past and which they will continue to follow in the future, including the handling of information received from Canadian sources, are consistent with the assurances you seek. These agencies operate under a Directive which provides that any Agency receiving information from another may not transmit such information outside its own organization without the consent of the originating agency. Further it is my understanding that, in addition to the above Directive governing dissemination of information by Executive Agencies of my Government, the security agencies of Canada and the United States which exchange information abide by the restrictions imposed by the sender upon the user as they relate to further dissemination.

It is reassuring to note that the Canadian Government continues to share the conviction of my Government that this reciprocal exchange of information has assisted substantially in maintaining the security of our two countries. This is but one of the many fields in which continued cooperation has been amply demonstrated in the past and which is so clearly in our mutual interest in the future. As has been the practice in the past, the two governments will continue to consult concerning mutually satisfactory arrangements

covering the exchange of information between them.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ROBERT MURPHY
Deputy Under Secretary

His Excellency
NORMAN ROBERTSON,
Canadian Ambassador.

Text of Interim Reply

Press release 224 dated April 19

APRIL 18, 1957

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 195 of April 10, 1957, which expresses the concern of the Canadian Government with reference to the handling of security information relating to Canadian citizens. I wish to assure you that the views of your Government are receiving the serious attention of the Department of State.

The Department is bringing to the attention of the appropriate executive agencies your Government's position in the exchange of information, which, as stated in your note, has assisted substantially in maintaining the security of our two countries.

The matter will be pursued vigorously and the Department will be in touch with your Embassy.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

ROBERT MURPHY
Deputy Under Secretary

His Excellency
A. D. P. HEENEY,
Canadian Ambassador.

Text of Canadian Note

No. 195

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 10, 1957

SIR: I am instructed by my Government to take up as a matter of urgency with the United States Government, the question of the procedures which have been followed intermittently by the Internal Security sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in releasing the names of Canadians who have been mentioned in the proceedings of that sub-Committee, particularly in executive session.

The Canadian Government has more than once com-

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plained of the methods employed by that sub-Committee in releasing the names of Canadians and has stated that if the names of Canadian officials appear in evidence before investigating committees in Washington, those names should be sent in confidence to the Canadian Government so that the allegations can be investigated and dealt with in Canada.

In our view, it is essential that this procedure requested by the Canadian Government, should be followed and that references made in proceedings of the sub-Committee to individual Canadians should not first be made known to the Canadian Government through the press.

As the United States Government knows, the Canadian Government finds the procedures actually adopted by the sub-Committee with respect to Canadians difficult to understand, unfair and indeed intolerable. The Canadian Government therefore requests again that these procedures be altered insofar as Canadians are concerned along the lines indicated above.

The Canadian Government has a duty to protect Canadian citizens by all means legally at its disposal from unwarranted interference by any foreign government. There is little that the Canadian Government can do, however, to make this protection effective for those Canadian citizens whose names are made public by Congressional Committees, unless it is able to secure the cooperation of the United States Government.

The United States Government is aware that the appropriate security agencies of the two governments have in the past exchanged security information on a reciprocal basis when such information formed part of an investigation important to the security of either country. This reciprocal exchange of information has assisted substantially in maintaining the security of our two countries, and the Canadian Government is not suggesting that it has been improperly used by the security agencies in the United States with which this exchange takes place.

Nevertheless the Canadian Government must take every precaution which lies within its power to protect Canadian citizens from the danger of this information falling into the hands of persons who might use it without any sense of responsibility or fairness, or regard for the rights of Canadian citizens, within the jurisdiction of Canada.

In view of the conduct of Congressional investigations affecting Canadians, and because of its responsibility for taking every precaution in its power to protect Canadian citizens, the Canadian Government requests that, in the reciprocal exchange of security information, the United States Government give its assurance that none of its agencies or departments will pass such information to any committee, body or organization in the United States over which the Executive Branch of the United States Government has no executive control, without the express consent of the Canadian Government in each case. The Canadian Government for its part assures the United States Government that any security information on United States citizens supplied by United States agencies to the security agency of the Canadian Government will be given similar protection in Canada to that now re-

quested with respect to security information about Canadians from the United States Government.

Unless such an assurance can be given, I am instructed by my Government to inform you that the Canadian Government must reserve the right in future not to supply security information concerning Canadian citizens to any United States Government agency.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

A. D. P. HEENEY
Ambassador

The Honourable

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

U.S. Agrees To Discuss Exchange of Radio-TV Experts With U.S.S.R.

Following is the text of an aide memoire handed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Sergei R. Striganov, on August 16 by the Director of the East-West Contacts Staff, Frederick T. Merrill, together with the text of the Soviet Government's proposal of July 26, 1957.

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF AUGUST 16

Press release 467 dated August 16

The Department of State has given careful consideration to the Aide-Memoire of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated July 26, 1957, concerning the exchange of radio and television broadcasts between the United States and the U.S.S.R., originally suggested in an Aide-Memoire of the Department of State, June 24, 1957.¹

The Department of State is gratified to learn from the referenced Aide-Memoire that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss proposals for organizing such an exchange on a reciprocal basis. The Department is convinced that these exchanges, periodic, uncensored and reciprocal in nature, can be planned and executed in a manner which will make a significant contribution to the easing of international tensions and the increase of mutual understanding between the two countries. The Department is pleased to note that the Soviet Union holds the same view.

¹ BULLETIN of July 15, 1957, p. 119.

As the Soviet Government is aware, the United States is eager to take any and all appropriate steps which will accelerate and increase the development of exchanges between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The Department cannot agree that the United States has imposed, as alleged by the U.S.S.R., any barriers, artificial or otherwise, to the full development of such contacts. Nor can the Department agree that the fingerprinting requirement of the United States immigration legislation is an obstacle to such development; it is rather the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the requirement that prevents the expansion of contacts which is agreed to be in the mutual interest of the United States and the Soviet Union. There are other countries aside from the Soviet Union in which fingerprinting is not the usual method of identification, but the fact it is routine practice in the United States has never been an obstacle to exchanges between these countries and the United States.

These facts have already been brought to the attention of the Soviet Government through its Embassy in Washington, and frequent discussions between Department of State officers and officials of the Soviet Embassy have already taken place regarding exchanges. Nevertheless, to the end that all reasonable measures be taken to facilitate further the technical, scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries, the United States is prepared to accept the proposal of the U.S.S.R. to begin negotiations on the development of contacts of this nature in conjunction with periodic exchanges of radio and TV broadcasts. Preliminary to such discussions, which could take place in October between the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and representatives of the Department of State, and in order that both countries may be better acquainted with each other's facilities in the field of broadcasting, it is suggested that small delegations of radio and TV experts be exchanged at an early date. If the Soviet Government agrees, the Department of State is ready to discuss immediately with the Soviet Embassy the details of the exchange visits of these radio and TV experts, which might take place in September.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 16, 1957.

SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE OF JULY 26

Translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. has considered the Aide Memoire of the Department of State of the U.S.A., which was handed on June 24, 1957 to Ambassador G. N. Zaroubin of the U.S.S.R. by Mr. W. Lacy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, concerning the exchange of radio and television broadcasts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

As has been repeatedly stated in the past, the Soviet Union is in favor of developing by every means economic, scientific, and cultural ties with all countries, including the U.S.A., on the principle that the development of such ties contributes to the easing of international tension, the strengthening of mutual understanding between peoples, and the development of international co-operation.

Bearing in mind the fact that the exchange of radio and television broadcasts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. may be organized in such a way that it would contribute to the achievement of these noble aims, willingness is hereby expressed to discuss a proposal for organizing such an exchange on a reciprocal basis.

As is well known, during recent years the Soviet side has made a number of concrete proposals to the American side for the development of ties between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., especially for the exchange of various delegations of scientists and specialists, and likewise for exchange trips, from the U.S.S.R. to the U.S.A. and from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R., of musical and theatrical groups and individual performers. Unfortunately, as a result of the position taken by the Government of the U.S.A., contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. have not hitherto been properly developed. It might be noted, for instance, that as early as the spring of 1956, the Embassy of the U.S.A. in Moscow was handed a note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. in which the question was brought up of an exchange of six delegations of specialists on a reciprocal basis. However, in view of the position taken by the American side, negotiations on this subject have lagged and have not produced any positive results.

A great obstacle to the development of contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is the fingerprinting requirement contained in the American immigration regulations—which is contrary to generally accepted international norms—as an indispensable condition for entry of Soviet citizens into the U.S.A. This requirement has led to the abandonment of proposed trips to the U.S.A. of several Soviet delegations and groups, including the State folk-dance ensemble of the U.S.S.R. It is also noted that American artistic groups, such as the "Everyman's Opera" troupe and the Boston Symphony Orchestra, have visited the Soviet Union and appeared on the Soviet stage.

The American fingerprinting requirement has closed the door to trips of Soviet tourists to the U.S.A., while at the same time American tourists visit the Soviet Union without any hindrance. Suffice it to say that in 1956 alone more than 1,200 American tourists visited the Soviet

Union, while not a single Soviet tourist has yet found it possible to take a trip to the U.S.A.

It is evident from the above that the development of contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is encountering serious obstacles that hinder the progress of Soviet-American scientific and cultural exchange, to say nothing of economic and commercial ties, the expansion of which at the present time has become practically impossible because of the position taken in this matter by the Government of the U.S.A.

In the light of this, it would seem appropriate to consider the question of a regular exchange of radio and television broadcasts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. together with other questions of the development of contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States, including that of removing the artificial barriers set up by the American side which hinder the full development of ties between the Soviet and American peoples.

In view of the fact that the full development of ties and contacts between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would unquestionably help improve Soviet-American relations, the Ministry proposes that the Government of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Government begin negotiations on the question of the development of such contacts and ties as a whole, including the question of the exchange of radio and television broadcasts, for the purpose of putting the development of ties and contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on a lasting basis.

U.S. Protests to U.S.S.R. on Closing of Peter the Great Bay

Press release 459 dated August 13

Following is the text of a note delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 12 protesting the closure of Peter the Great Bay.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, on instructions from its Government, has the honor to refer to the recent announcements in the Soviet press regarding action by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. with respect to the boundary of internal waters in the area of Peter the Great Bay. That action purported to extend that boundary to a line, approximately 115 miles long, joining the estuary of the River Tyumen-Ula and the Povorotny promontory and to require previous permission from Soviet authorities for ships or aircraft to enter Peter the Great Bay. The Government of the United States most strongly protests the reported action of the Coun-

cil of Ministers, which it regards as contrary to international law.

Under international law, the body of water enclosed by the line drawn between the estuary of the River Tyumen-Ula and the Povorotny promontory cannot, either geographically or historically, be regarded as part of the internal waters of the U.S.S.R. The Government of the United States views the action of the Council of Ministers as constituting an attempt by the Government of the U.S.S.R. unlawfully to appropriate a large area of the high seas by unilateral action. Such an attempt has no foundation in international law and encroaches upon the well-established principle of freedom of the seas.

The Government of the United States must, therefore, regard the enforcement of this decree as violative of the fundamental principles of international law and reserves its right to take such action as it deems necessary to protect each and all of its rights in the area of Peter the Great Bay. The Government of the United States requests that the Government of the U.S.S.R. reconsider the reported action of the Council of Ministers and conform it to the requirements of international law.

Syrian Ambassador and Second Secretary Declared Persona Non Grata

Press release 462 dated August 14

The United States regrets that the present Syrian Government has seen fit to adopt an increasingly unfriendly attitude toward this country. This attitude has been reflected in unfounded official pronouncements concerning American actions and policies which culminated on August 12 in the obviously fabricated charge of U.S. involvement in a plot against the Syrian Government. There followed a demand for the recall of three officers of the American Embassy in Damascus.

Despite its desire to maintain friendly relations with Syria, this action by the present Syrian Government, as that Government must have realized, left the United States with no alternative but to take certain steps. Accordingly, the Syrian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim was summoned to the Department of State on August 14 and a

strong protest lodged with him against the Government-inspired slanderous campaign which has been carried on against the United States by the Syrian press and by the official Syrian radio and against the allegations regarding United States involvement in a plot against the Syrian Government. The Department also protested interference with an American diplomatic courier at the Syrian border on August 12. It further protested the totally unwarranted action taken against the three officers of the Embassy at Damascus.

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim was handed a

note declaring as *persona non grata* to the Government of the United States the Syrian Ambassador, Dr. Farid Zeineddine, and Dr. Yassin Zakaria, Second Secretary of the Syrian Embassy. Ambassador Zeineddine is not at present in this country. Dr. Zakaria was asked to depart not later than August 16.

The American Ambassador to Syria, James S. Moose, Jr., having departed from Damascus on June 30 for home leave and reassignment, is not returning to Syria.

Our China Policy

by William J. Sebald
Ambassador to Australia¹

As this is your first introduction to me as well as mine to you, I would like to take this opportunity to explain some of my thinking and that of my Government about one of the most important problems with which we are concerned in the Pacific area. That problem relates to Communist China.

I have spent a good many years in Asia, but this is the first time I have had an opportunity to view the Far East from the perspective one gains from down under. I think it might be useful, therefore, if I began my discussion with a brief survey of the horizon as I see it from here. It is not likely that my estimate will be identical with yours, as you have had the advantage of seeing the problems of the Far East from this particular standpoint throughout your lives. I believe, however, that our conclusions will be generally similar.

As I look upward at the map of Asia from Australia, I am struck by the fact that in its broadest essentials the Far East appears very much the same from here as it does from Washington. The most striking feature is the control

of much of the land mass of Asia by international communism. Further, the real core of the problem our two countries face today in the Pacific is the deadly hostility of the Chinese Communist regime with its unwavering espousal of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. These principles, as we know, envisage the conquest of the non-Communist world and the destruction of free institutions.

This threat, by its very nature, necessarily shapes our attitude toward the area. We, the United States, consider that to ignore this threat, no matter how much we might wish it were not there, would be to imperil the interests not only of ourselves but of all the nations of the free world. Our objective in the formulation of a realistic policy for the Far East, therefore, seeks to serve the interests of the greatest possible number of the countries of the area, including our own.

What, then, is this policy?

The Secretary of State took occasion to restate the essential elements of our China policy in the SEATO Council meeting at Canberra last March 12.² He divided this policy into three main aspects: first, to recognize the Republic of China; second, *not* to recognize the so-called People's Re-

¹ Address made before the New South Wales Chapter of the Australian-American Association at Sydney on July 26.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 1, 1957, p. 531.

public of China; and third, to oppose the seating of this "People's Republic" in the United Nations. And at San Francisco on June 28³ he made it clear that we have abstained, and continue to abstain, "from any act to encourage the Communist regime—morally, politically, or materially."

Importance of Free China

The importance of the continued existence of Free China is often underestimated and misunderstood. Not only does Taiwan (Formosa) in friendly hands constitute an important bastion of the free world and a deterrent to Chinese Communist expansion, but the Republic of China offers the only alternative for the loyalty of millions of overseas Chinese as well as countless millions of non-Communist Chinese on the mainland. Extinguish that free government and the last hope for many of these non-Communist Chinese will be gone, with grave consequences for the cause of the free world throughout Asia.

The Republic of China has a record of an awareness of the menace of communism reaching farther back than that of most countries and an honorable record as a faithful and loyal ally through the dark days of World War II.

Free China is also a symbol to the countries of the Far East of the free world's determination and ability to resist Communist encroachment and to provide conditions under which free countries can remain free. A change in the status of Free China would, I believe, have a chain-reaction effect which would seriously weaken the free world.

The United States has a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China. This is an important element in the complex of bilateral and multilateral pacts which have contributed to the stabilization of the Far East.

Australia likewise participates in and supports treaty arrangements and other programs designed to maintain peace and security in the Western Pacific and in East and Southeast Asia. I believe your generous role in the Colombo Plan, your participation in ANZUS, the major part you play in SEATO, your awareness of the aggressive posture of Communist China, and your continued diplomatic relations with the Republic of China are all significant contributions to the objectives of the free world.

The results are easy to see: Those nations with

³ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1957, p. 91.

which we have mutual defense treaties remain free. We believe that they will continue so, for communism strikes at weakness, never where strength is the deterrent. That this is so is illustrated by the fact that of almost a score of nations which in whole or major part have been seized by international communism not one was at the time of seizure protected by a treaty of mutual security and the common defense system created thereunder. Conversely, not one nation which did share in such a common defense has been lost to international communism.

Recognition of Red China

There are those who say that beneficial results would accrue from United States recognition of Red China. We should first of all note, however, that recognition in international law has always been extended by the recognizing power as a privilege. It has never been construed as a right of the power being recognized.

A balancing of the arguments for and against recognition plainly reveals cogent and, to my view, overwhelming reasons why such recognition should not—indeed, must not—be extended. I will mention a few:

1. Communist China still illegally holds Americans in defiance of commonly accepted standards of international behavior and decency and in utter disregard of her 1955 pledge at Geneva to release them.

2. Many American citizens, men and women, were horribly mistreated, tortured, and brainwashed over long periods by the Chinese Communists. They were held on specious charges and as political hostages in an endeavor to force political concessions from the United States Government.

3. Red China still stands condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations. The memory of the lives sacrificed by the United Nations members in repelling the Communist aggression in Korea—Australians and Americans among them—will, of course, always remain with us.

4. We, here in these comfortable and friendly surroundings in a country of peace and plenty, are apt to forget that in Korea two armies, totaling more than a million men, face each other across a thin strip of no-man's land. The army facing southward is largely Communist Chinese; its

logistic base is Communist China. That army is there not by right but as a fruit of aggression.

5. Nor should we forget that the Communist army in Korea is deployed against the United Nations. Moreover, the war against the United Nations has only been stopped by armistice, not by political settlement. The conference at Geneva in 1954 was shattered upon the rocks of Communist Chinese intransigence.

6. Red China has cynically violated the armistice agreements in Korea and in Viet-Nam. In both places she has used the device of the armistice to build up and strengthen the Communist armies in total disregard of her written agreements.

7. Opposite Taiwan, on the mainland, an enormous military buildup continues, thus facing the United States and its allies with a continuing threat to use force. This does not give promise of peaceful behavior by the Communist Chinese regime in the future.

8. At Geneva, where talks with the Communist Chinese representative have continued for 2 years, the Communists have yet to agree to a meaningful and reciprocal renunciation of force.

Many of the considerations on which we base our continued recognition of the Republic of China are also among the reasons why we withhold recognition from Communist China. On this point, in his San Francisco address to which I referred earlier, Secretary Dulles said that if we were to recognize Communist China:

The free Asian governments of the Pacific and South-east Asia would be gravely perplexed. . . . If we seemed to waver and to compromise with communism in China, that would in turn weaken free Asia resistance to the Chinese Communist regime and assist international communism to score a great success in its program to encircle us.

I am sure you as Australians must be aware of this aspect of any policy which would enhance the power or prestige of Communist China, whether it be with regard to recognition, trade, or cultural contacts. You naturally have a great interest and deep concern in developments in the parts of Asia lying nearest your own country. This must cause you to reflect in all seriousness on the potential menace to your own security which Communist China poses.

If the United States with her great influence in world affairs were to enter into friendly relationship with Communist China, how would the Asian nations protect themselves against inter-

national communism? Would this not result in a sudden rush to recognize Red China, thus greatly magnifying existing dangers?

Think of the greater mischief which international communism could work among the nations in the area, should Communist China acquire diplomatic rehabilitation and the trappings of political respectability in consequence of recognition by the United States or admission to the United Nations. Communist China would thereby gain additional opportunities for subversion, espionage, economic warfare, intimidation, and coercion. This would be the all too likely result of acceptance by those nations of the conspiratorial networks inherent in the Communist system of international relations.

The experiences of the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and Australia serve to point up this conclusion as we recall the cases of Fuchs and May, Gouzenko, Coplon, and, of course, Petrov.

I have heard it said that Communist China has changed its attitude and that it now wishes to be friendly with its neighbors and with the United States, and, further, that it is the United States which refuses to change.

I know of no action or change on the part of Communist China—the regime which promoted foreign or civil wars in Korea, Indochina, Tibet, the Philippines, and Malaya—which might be construed as an action or change for peace.

As for United States policy, this is not immutable and is subject to the acid test of the requirement to serve the cause of peace. As Secretary Dulles so aptly phrased it in his speech at San Francisco:

Our policies are readily adjustable to meet the requirements of changing conditions. But there are occasions when not we but others should provide the change. Nothing could be more dangerous than for the United States to operate on the theory that, if hostile and evil forces do not quickly or readily change, then it is we who must change to meet them.

The essential elements of our China policy are closely related. The same logic which underlies our opposition to extend recognition also determines our decision to oppose according a seat in the United Nations to Communist China. The charter of the United Nations stipulates that members shall be peace-loving and that member governments shall be able and willing to carry out

their obligations under the charter. By its aggressive and truculent actions, we are forewarned that Communist China does not qualify under these criteria.

We also hear the argument advanced that we cannot deny to 600 million people the right to be heard or to be represented in the United Nations. I would ask, does the Communist regime *represent* the Chinese people? Can a militant minority which has seized power through force and which maintains itself through ruthless dictatorship rightfully claim to be representative? By its own definition the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat is the antithesis of representation.

In the face of these considerations we are unable to agree that the Chinese Communist regime should represent the Chinese people.

Trade With Communist China

We are often taken to task because of our refusal to trade with Communist China. Various arguments are advanced to demonstrate that the American policy of maintaining a complete embargo on *all* trade with mainland China is wrong. I shall not reiterate today the many reasons why we do not trade, except for this observation: trade with Communist China is not free trade; rather it is an official purchase of materials and equipment designed to build up the Communist military establishment. In the words of our Secretary of State, "Whatever others may do, surely the United States, which has heavy security commitments in the China area, ought not build up the military power of its potential enemy."

I have said enough, I believe, to demonstrate my original thesis that the problem of Communist China is the source from which stem most of our other problems in Asia. It is the outward pressure of Communist China toward all the lands between here and the Chinese mainland that stands out conspicuously in any estimate of the Asian situation.

As we look to the north, it is apparent that no single nation in the arc of Asia is free from the Communist threat. This threat takes the form of military force, internal subversion, economic aggrandizement, cultural penetration, or any or all of these.

We feel that our policy of refusing to be stampeded into adding to the strength of the Communist Chinese regime is not only in the best in-

terest of the United States but also in the best interest of the free countries of Asia and the great masses of non-Communist Chinese to whom I have previously referred.

And now, my friends, there remains for us here the task of relating this policy to the realities of our association with Australia. Certainly geographical isolation for both Australia and the United States is a thing of the past. Neither of us can, therefore, ignore the menace of the Communist threat. You know, as I know, that the long arm of international communism must be met with courage and strength and, above all, with resolution to defend our God-given heritage and way of life.

To my mind, great opportunity, great obligations, and great dangers confront us both. We in America have watched with satisfaction and appreciation the way in which Australia has assumed an increasing role of leadership in the Pacific area. As a member of the Commonwealth, which the United States regards as one of the greatest of all stabilizing influences, as well as in her own right, Australia can and does contribute political, economic, and social strength toward regional solidarity in the Far East. In this significant effort you share with us great responsibility in achieving our common objective of peace and prosperity.

Americans' Trip to Communist China Called Violation of U.S. Policy

Press release 460 dated August 13

Department Announcement

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson was instructed on August 12 to attempt to convey a personal message from Acting Secretary Herter to as many as possible of those American citizens in Moscow who have indicated an intention to accept an invitation to visit Communist China.¹

Ambassador Thompson was also instructed to make available to those contacted the text of Secre-

¹Of a group of 160 American students in Moscow for the Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship, about 40 have indicated their intention to accept an offer by the Communist Chinese to tour Communist China.

tary Dulles' address of June 28 entitled "Our Policies Toward Communism in China."²

Text of Message

DEAR FELLOW CITIZEN: The Department of State has been informed that a number of United States citizens presently in Moscow have been invited to visit Communist China and that some of them have indicated an intention to accept the invitation. This letter is addressed only to those citizens of the United States who are contemplating such travel to or in Communist China.

The policy of the United States with respect to Communism in China, non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, and related matters has been recently restated by the Secretary of State in his address of June 28, 1957, at San Francisco. Generally speaking, it is not consistent with the policy of the United States, as approved by the President, that citizens of the United States travel to the areas of China under Communist control.

There are many reasons for this, and they are cumulative. They include the non-recognition of the regime; the existence of a quasi state of war and the continued application of the Trading with the Enemy Act; the refusal of Communist China to renounce the use of force; and the illegal jailing of Americans already in China despite promises to let them out.

Suffice it to say that those officials of your Government who are charged with responsibility in this matter have soberly and definitely come to the conclusion here expressed. Most of your fellow citizens—even those who may desire a change in some aspects of this policy—have accepted it. The Department of State has already received requests from parents requesting that their children be informed of their strong disapproval of any travel to Communist China.

For you to determine to travel to Communist China in violation of the declared policy of your Government is a serious matter, not to be undertaken lightly. By so doing, you will be violating the restriction plainly stamped in your passport. If you persist in violating this restriction, at the first possible opportunity your passport will be marked valid only for travel for direct return to the United States and your passport will be

taken up when you do so return. In the event that you make application for a passport at a later date, your wilful violation of passport restrictions will be duly considered in connection with such application.

Your attention is further called to the fact that travel to and in Communist China at this time may well involve violation of regulations issued and enforced under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which constitutes a criminal offense under our law.

There may be some of you who feel that by going to Communist China and debating the position of Democracy as against Communism you may be doing a service in offsetting the propaganda efforts of others less well-intentioned. If you believe this, you are in error. By traveling to Communist China at this time you will, in the considered view of your Government, be acting as a willing tool of Communist propaganda intended, wherever possible, to subvert the foreign policy and the best interests of the United States, of which you are a citizen.

I request that you reconsider any intention or thought you may have had of going to Communist China at this time.

Sincerely yours,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Acting Secretary.

Action Taken To Maintain Military Balance in Korea

Following is the text of a special report by the Unified Command in Korea (U.N. doc. A/3631) transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General on August 9 by the U.S. Representative to the U.N.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

NEW YORK, 9 August 1957

The representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit eight copies of a special report concerning certain action recently taken by the Unified Command in Korea in order to maintain a relative military balance in Korea and thus to preserve the stability of the

² BULLETIN of July 15, 1957, p. 91.

armistice. This report is submitted by the United States Government in its capacity as the Unified Command. Attached to the report as an annex is the text of the statement by the representative of the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission meeting made at Panmunjom, Korea, on 21 June 1957.¹

It is requested that the text of the report and its attachment be circulated to all Members of the United Nations as a General Assembly document.

TEXT OF UNIFIED COMMAND REPORT

UNIFIED COMMAND REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND STATEMENT IN THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION ON 21 JUNE 1957

The Government of the United States, in its capacity as the Unified Command, presents herewith a special report concerning certain action recently taken by the United Nations Command in order to maintain a relative military balance in Korea and thus to preserve the stability of the armistice.

Despite sincere efforts by the nations represented in the United Nations Command, the Communist side has made it impossible to achieve the political settlement contemplated in article IV of the Armistice Agreement. Although after long delay there was convened at Geneva in 1954 a political conference on Korea, the Communist delegations throughout that conference insisted that the United Nations were the real aggressors in Korea and refused to recognize the authority of the United Nations to supervise general elections in Korea. The report of the fifteen United Nations Members participating in the conference was approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 1954.² In the absence of any indication that the Communist side will be willing in the foreseeable future to agree to a political settlement in Korea on a basis in conformity with the long-standing United Nations objectives, the Armistice Agreement must continue to provide the basis for maintenance of peace in Korea.

The frustration of United Nations efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Korea and

the consequent prolongation of the armistice have, however, created for the United Nations Command a grave problem in maintaining its military strength relative to that of the Communist Command.

Certain provisions of the Armistice Agreement,³ particularly sub-paragraph 13(d) were designed to maintain the relative military balance existing on 27 July 1953, until a political settlement was achieved. Under this paragraph both sides were to "Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type."

Within twenty-four hours of the signature of the Armistice Agreement, the Communist side began to introduce aircraft into north Korea in complete disregard of these provisions. During the past four years the Communist side has, in fact, violated that agreement in the following particulars:

(1) It has introduced reinforcing combat equipment of the types referred to in sub-paragraph 13(d) in contravention of the provisions allowing only piece-for-piece replacement of equipment destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the date of the armistice.

(2) It has also introduced combat equipment and weapons of new and improved types and effectiveness from any it had in Korea at the time of the armistice.

(3) It has failed to report introductions of such equipment.

(4) It has introduced such equipment at ports of entry other than those specified in the Armistice Agreement.

Through the introduction of weapons of improved and different types and in increased quantities, the Communist side increased its military matériel effectiveness and over-all strength to a point where the relative military balance between the two sides, which was provided for by the armistice and upon which the maintenance of

¹Not printed here. For text, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1957, p. 58.

²See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 17, document A/2786. [Footnote in original.]

³See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079. [Footnote in original.]

peace depends, was upset. This situation was further aggravated by the fact that in contrast to this performance, the United Nations Command refrained from introducing the improved types of weapons available to it and confined its replacement to a piece-for-piece basis of types in Korea on 27 July 1953, in strict accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 13(d).

In increasing its strength, the Communist side failed to report its introduction of matériel to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as it is required to do under sub-paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, which provides in part: "In order to justify the requirements for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced." Since the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was prevented by Communist obstruction from discharging effectively its responsibilities, there was no assurance that the disparity between the opposing forces would not continue and, indeed, increase. Efforts by the United Nations Command to rectify this situation by action in the Military Armistice Commission and through the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission have, as previously reported, been to no avail.

Since the Communist side in Korea has failed to observe the "piece-for-piece" limitation as well as the provisions for reporting to and inspection by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the introduction of replacement items only through the specified ports of entry, it is impossible to state definitively the full extent of the Communist military build-up in north Korea. Operational aircraft have been introduced where at the time of the armistice there were none in Korea north of the demarcation line. New and improved artillery and mortars have also entered north Korea since the armistice. Specifically, the Communists have illegally introduced large numbers of combat aircraft, mostly jet fighters, and now maintain an air force of more than 700 planes based in north Korea. In addition to aircraft, the Communists have also illegally introduced large numbers of ground weapons into north Korea

including artillery pieces in the category of 122 mm. or larger, the 75/76 gun/howitzer, and 120 mm. mortars.

The mission of the Unified Command in Korea under the Armistice Agreement is to maintain the cease-fire and, as paragraph 13 puts it, "insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement." In the light of Communist actions, to refrain from replacing obsolete matériel with the more modern weapons now available would jeopardize the mission of the Unified Command and the original purposes of paragraph 13 as well as the entire Armistice Agreement. The maintenance of the stability of the situation in Korea requires preservation of the balance in relative effectiveness of the type of matériel in the hands of the two sides. And this is true quite independently of the proposition that violations by the other side are considered to entitle the Unified Command to be relieved of its corresponding obligations to the extent that will enable it to take appropriate defensive counter-measures.

It was in this spirit that the United States, acting as the Unified Command, discussed this matter with the other Governments which contributed forces to repel the aggression in Korea. It was decided that the United Nations Command would proceed as it deems necessary to replace its weapons in such a manner as to give full effect to its responsibilities under the resolutions of the United Nations and its consequent obligations.

Accordingly, on 21 June 1957, the United Nations Command announced to the Communist side in the Military Armistice Commission that "In view of these facts and your gross violations of the provisions of sub-paragraph 13(d), the United Nations Command considers that it is entitled to be relieved of corresponding obligations under the provisions of this sub-paragraph until such time as the relative military balance has been restored and your side, by its actions, has demonstrated its willingness to comply."

In the announcement it was made clear that:

(1) The only purpose of the United Nations Command action is to restore the relative balance of military strength that the armistice was intended to preserve.

(2) The United Nations Command does not intend to start an arms race and draws attention

to the fact that the replacement weapons are being deployed for defensive purposes only.

(3) The United Nations Command intends, as it has in the past, fully to observe the cease-fire and all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement save to the extent to which it is entitled to be relieved from compliance because of Communist violations of sub-paragraph 13(d) and of those covered in its statement to the Military Armistice Commission of 31 May 1956.

The United Nations Command is satisfied that, under the circumstances which now exist in Korea, the course of action taken is the one which best fulfills the essential purpose of paragraph 13 "to insure the stability of the Armistice," and of the Armistice Agreement as a whole to have "an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed forces in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.

The text of the statement by the representative of the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission on 21 June 1957 is attached.⁴

IFC Investment in Mexico

The International Finance Corporation announced on August 12 that it has reached agreement, subject to completion of the necessary legal formalities, for an investment of the equivalent of U.S.\$600,000 in Engranes y Productos Industriales, S.A., a Mexican company, for expansion of manufacturing operations. The company is owned by Mexican and American stockholders. The board of directors includes Marte R. Gomez, president of Worthington de Mexico and former Mexican Secretary of the Treasury, and Harmon Whittington, president, Anderson Clayton and Company, of Houston, Tex.

The Corporation's investment, its first in Mexico, together with an investment by the company, will be used to expand the plant facilities and business of the company for manufacture of a variety of industrial products and components. The program includes machine tooling for the manufacture of automotive and other mechanical parts, a forge shop, and an electric steel furnace. The expanded project will represent the first

manufacture in Mexico of automotive differential gears and universal joints, hydraulic jacks, and rock-drill parts. Production of some of these items will start this autumn and should be completed for all items in 1958. In the manufacture of certain automotive parts the company operates under license to Borg-Warner Corporation of Chicago, Ill.

Engranes is the outgrowth of three separate manufacturing enterprises started in 1953 by H. C. Carney, an American who went to Mexico in 1947. The company was formed on March 31, 1957, by the consolidation of the three enterprises: a machine shop mainly producing gear drives and parts for deep-well water pumps; an iron and nonferrous-metal foundry producing a variety of castings; and a plate shop producing tanks and other steel fabrications. In the formation of the company a substantial amount of new capital was raised.

IFC's investment of the equivalent of U.S. \$600,000 will be in notes, half denominated in dollars and half in pesos. Both the dollar and peso portions will bear interest at 7 percent per annum, plus contingent interest related to the company's future earnings. The final maturity of the notes will be 10 years, amortization beginning during the fourth year, to retire the issue in equal semi-annual amounts. In addition, IFC receives a 10-year option on shares equivalent to the conversion of 40 percent of the total IFC investment. The notes will be redeemable at par at any time.

IFC's investment is unsecured, but the contract between Engranes y Productos Industriales, S.A., and IFC will contain the usual protective covenants.

Disbursement of the IFC investment will be in installments as required with the company paying a customary commitment fee on the undisbursed portion.

Delegation to Inaugural Ceremonies in Dominican Republic

Press release 456 dated August 12

President Eisenhower has named Joseph S. Farland his personal representative to head the U.S. delegation to the inauguration of the President-elect of the Dominican Republic, Gen. Héctor B. Trujillo Molina. Mr. Farland is the U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

⁴ Not printed here.

The delegation will include, with the rank of special ambassador to represent the President, Joyce C. Hall of Kansas City, Mo.

Other members of the U.S. delegation are:

Robert F. Woodward, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
William A. Wieland, director, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State
Brig. Gen. Bertram C. Harrison, commander, 72d Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, U.S. Air Force

Members of the U.S. Embassy staff at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, also named on the delegation are:

Francis L. Spalding, Counselor of Embassy
Comdr. Ralph C. McCoy, U.S. Naval Attaché
Lt. Col. Joseph E. Treadway, U.S. Army Attaché

The inauguration of President-elect Trujillo will take place on August 16. The ceremonies incident thereto will last from August 14 through August 18.

President Asks for Investigation of Date Imports

White House press release dated August 7

The President has requested the United States Tariff Commission to make an immediate investigation of the effects of imports of dates on the Federal date marketing order program and the Department of Agriculture's program for the diversion of dates to new uses. The President's action was taken in response to a recommendation from the Secretary of Agriculture. The Commission's investigation will be made pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.

President's Letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman of Tariff Commission

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that there is reason to believe that dates are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective or materially interfere with the Federal Date Marketing Order Program and the Department's program for the diversion of dates to new uses. A copy of the Secretary's letter is enclosed.¹

¹ Not printed.

The United States Tariff Commission is requested to make an immediate investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, to determine the need for restricting imports of dates.

The Commission's findings should be completed as soon as practicable.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 1st Session

Emergency Oil Lift Program and Related Oil Problems. Joint hearings before subcommittees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs pursuant to S. Res. 57. Part 1, February 5-21, 1957, 871 pp.; Part 2, February 27-March 22, 1957. 720 pp.

Building a World of Free Peoples. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs at Boise, Idaho, May 18, 1957, 99 pp.; at Gary, Ind., May 20, 1957, 104 pp.

Compensation to Government of Denmark. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft bill to authorize payment to the Government of Denmark (S. 2448). May 21, 1957. 27 pp.

Amending Rule XXVI so as To Require Committee Reports Proposing Legislation or Ratifications of Treaties, Involving Expenditures of Public Funds, To Show the Estimated Costs Thereof. Report to accompany S. Res. 118. S. Rept. 705, July 25 (legislative day, July 8), 1957. 2 pp.

Amending the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Report to accompany S. 979. Rept. 612, July 16, 1957. 4 pp.

Sixth Semiannual Report on Activities Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as Amended, outlining operations under the act during the period January 1 through June 30, 1957. H. Doc. 212, July 22, 1957. 46 pp.

Amending the Interstate Commerce Act To Provide for the Preservation of Competitive Through Routes for Rail Carriers. Report to accompany H. R. 5384. H. Rept. 878, July 25, 1957. 4 pp.

Authorizing a Payment to the Government of Denmark. Report to accompany S. 2448. H. Rept. 928, July 30, 1957. 6 pp.

Amendment Recommended to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. Report to accompany Exec. M, 85th Cong., 1st sess. S. Exec. Rept. 9, July 26, 1957. 2 pp.

Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Report to accompany Exec. E, 85th Cong., 1st sess. S. Exec. Rept. 8, July 26, 1957. 11 pp.

Authorizing the Secretary of State To Evaluate and To Waive Collection of Certain Financial Assistance Loans. Report to accompany S. 747. S. Rept. 767, July 30 (legislative day, July 8), 1957. 2 pp.

Implementation of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions. Report to accompany S. 1779. S. Rept. 772, July 30 (legislative day, July 8), 1957. 5 pp.

Providing for the Recognition and Endorsement of the Second World Metallurgical Congress. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 404. H. Rept. 932, July 30, 1957. 2 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During August 1957

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 24th Session	Geneva	July 2-Aug. 3
Latin American Seminar on Social Welfare Training	Montevideo	July 20-Aug. 2
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 8th Session.	New York	July 22-Aug. 15
Caribbean Commission: Conference on Demographic Problems of the Caribbean Area.	Trinidad	July 25-Aug. 2
Pan American Highway Congress: Inter-American Meeting of Traffic Experts.	Panama City	July 29-Aug. 1
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Semiannual Meeting of Directing Council.	Lima	July 29-Aug. 3
7th Pan American Highway Congress	Panama City	Aug. 1-10
6th Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations Interested in Migration.	Geneva	Aug. 5-9
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Assessment of Hydroelectric Potential.	Bangkok	Aug. 5-9
International Statistical Institute: 30th Session	Stockholm	Aug. 8-15
ICEM Executive Committee: Special Emergency Session	Geneva	Aug. 12-14
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Inland Ports.	Bangkok	Aug. 19-29
Inter-American Indian Institute: Executive Committee	Mexico City	Aug. 22

In Session as of August 31, 1957

U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee on Disarmament	London	Mar. 18-
ILO "Art and Labor" Exposition	Geneva	June 15-
18th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art; and 7th International Exhibition of the Documentary and Short Film.	Venice	Aug. 12-
Universal Postal Union: 14th Congress	Ottawa	Aug. 14-
Organization of American States: Economic Conference	Buenos Aires	Aug. 15-
11th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 18-
International Scientific Radio Union: 12th General Assembly	Boulder, Colo.	Aug. 22-
ICAO Teletypewriter Technical Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Aug. 26-
7th British Commonwealth Forestry Conference	Australia and New Zealand	Aug. 26-
9th International Congress on Cell Biology	St. Andrews, Scotland	Aug. 28-
International Geographical Union: Regional Conference	Nara and Kyoto	Aug. 29-
International Union of Public Transportation: 33d Congress	Hamburg and Berlin	Aug. 29-
9th Pan American Railway Congress	Buenos Aires	Aug. 30-

Scheduled September 1-November 30, 1957

International Exposition of the Sea	Marseille	Sept. 1-
International Association on Quaternary Research: 5th International Congress.	Barcelona and Madrid	Sept. 2-
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 11th General Assembly.	Toronto	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Workshop on Problems of Budget Reclassification: 2d Meeting.	Bangkok	Sept. 3-
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 8th Session	Hong Kong	Sept. 5-
FAO/ECE Timber Committee: Committee on Forest Working Techniques and Training of Forest Workers.	Moscow	Sept. 9-
UNESCO International Conference on Radioisotopes	Paris	Sept. 9-
ICAO Communications Division: 6th Session	Montreal	Sept. 10-
ICAO Legal Committee: Special Subcommittee on Rule 57 of Standing Rules of Procedure.	Tokyo	Sept. 10-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 14, 1957. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September 1—November 30, 1957—Continued

PASO Executive Committee: 33d Meeting	Washington	Sept. 10—
ICAO Legal Committee: 11th Session	Tokyo	Sept. 12—
Interparliamentary Union: 46th Conference	London	Sept. 12—
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee	Ibadan, Nigeria	Sept. 16—
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Statistical Subcommittee	Ibadan, Nigeria	Sept. 16—
PASO Directing Council: 10th Meeting	Washington	Sept. 16—
U.N. ECAFE/FAO Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 3d Meeting	Bangkok	Sept. 16—
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 2d Meeting	Ibadan, Nigeria	Sept. 17—
International Union of Pure and Applied Physics: 9th General Assembly	Rome	Sept. 17—
U.N. General Assembly: 12th Session	New York	Sept. 17—
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport	Geneva	Sept. 17—
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund: 12th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors	Washington	Sept. 23—
4th FAO/WHO Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America	Guatemala City	Sept. 23—
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Fertilizers	Vercelli, Italy	Sept. 23—
FAO International Rice Commission: 7th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Breeding	Vercelli, Italy	Sept. 23—
FAO International Rice Commission: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Group on Soil-Water-Plant Relationships	Vercelli, Italy	Sept. 23—
IA-ECOSOC: Meeting of Experts on Technical Standards	Rio de Janeiro	Sept. 23—
17th International Conference of Sociology	Beirut	Sept. 23—
WMO Executive Committee: 9th Session	Geneva	Sept. 24—
ICEM Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Sept. 26*
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	Sept. 30—
9th Meeting of Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Preliminary Working Group	Saigon	Sept. 30—
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 45th Meeting	Bergen, Norway	Sept. 30—
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Technical Questions (Rail)	Geneva	Sept. 30—
FAO International Chestnut Commission	Geneva	September
FAO European Contact Group on Uses of Isotopes and Radiation in Agricultural Research	Bonn	September
GATT Balance-of-Payment Consultations	Geneva	September
GATT Intersessional Committee of Contracting Parties	Geneva	September
U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: 7th Session	New York	September
International Atomic Energy Agency: 1st General Conference and 1st Meeting of Board of Governors	Vienna	Oct. 1—
IA-ECOSOC Seminar on Rural Electrification Cooperatives	Recife City, Brazil	Oct. 5—
ICAO Preparatory Meeting on Air Traffic Control Problems in the European-Mediterranean Region	Lisbon	Oct. 7—
FAO International Fishing Gear Congress	Hamburg	Oct. 7—*
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 9th Meeting	Saigon	Oct. 7—
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Officials Meeting	Saigon	Oct. 7—
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 6th Session	Monterrey	Oct. 7—
ICEM Council: 7th Session	Geneva	Oct. 7*
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 2d Session	Washington	Oct. 7—
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee	Geneva	Oct. 10—
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session of Working Group on Telecommunications	Paris	Oct. 14*
U.N. ECE/FAO Timber Committee: 15th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14—
South Pacific Commission: 17th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 14—
U.N. ECAFE Highway Subcommittee: 4th Session	Bangkok	Oct. 14—
FAO Study Group on Grains: 2d Meeting	Rome	Oct. 17—
GATT Contracting Parties: 12th Session	Geneva	Oct. 17—
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Ministerial Meeting	Saigon	Oct. 21—
ILO Governing Body: 137th Session (and Committees)	Geneva	Oct. 21*
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East-West Trade Consultations	Geneva	Oct. 21—
UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts on Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials	Geneva	Oct. 21—
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22—
2d ICAO South American/South Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting	São Paulo	Oct. 22—

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September 1—November 30, 1957—Continued

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 29th Session.	Rome	Oct. 24-
FAO Committee on Relations With International Organizations . .	Rome	Oct. 24-
19th International Red Cross Conference	New Delhi	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session of Inland Waterways Subcommittee.	Malang, Indonesia	Oct. 24-
FAO Council: 27th Session	Rome	Oct. 31-
FAO Conference: 9th Session.	Rome	Nov. 2-
International Union of Travel Organizations: 12th General Assembly.	Washington	Nov. 3-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 5th Meeting. .	Vancouver	Nov. 4-
WMO Commission for Bibliography and Publications: 2d Session. .	Paris	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 3d Meeting.	Calcutta	Nov. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Industry and Trade Committee: 3d Session of Subcommittee on Minerals Resources.	Calcutta	Nov. 5-
Caribbean Commission: 7th Session of West Indian Conference. .	Curaçao	Nov. 11-
ICAO Radiotelephony Speech Panel: 1st Meeting.	Europe or Montreal	Nov. 12*
4th ILO Asian Regional Conference.	New Delhi	Nov. 13-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: 5th Session of Committee on Improvement of National Statistics (COINS).	Washington	Nov. 14-
9th Pacific Science Congress	Bangkok	Nov. 18-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 15th Session and Working Parties. .	Geneva	Nov. 18-
UNESCO Executive Board: 49th Session.	Paris	Nov. 18-
FAO Study Group on Coconut and Coconut Products.	Rome	Nov. 22-
FAO Council: 28th Session.	Rome	Nov. 23*
Caribbean Commission: 25th Meeting.	Curaçao	Nov. 25-
Customs Cooperation Council: 11th Session	Brussels	Nov. 25-
ILO Technical Tripartite Meeting on Mines Other Than Coal Mines. .	Geneva	Nov. 25-
International Sugar Council: 14th Session	London	Nov. 25-
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee.	London	Nov. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 5th Session of Railway Subcommittee.	(Undetermined)	Nov. 25-
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee	London	Nov. 26-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Committee on Biology and Research.	Vancouver	November
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 4th Session.	New York	November
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	New York	November

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

14th Congress of the Universal Postal Union

The Department of State announced on August 12 (press release 457) that the United States will be represented by the following delegation at the 14th Congress of the Universal Postal Union, which will convene at Ottawa, Canada, August 14:

E. George Siedle, *chairman*, Assistant Postmaster General
Greever Allan, *director*, Division of International Service, Post Office Department
Frederick E. Batrus, *special assistant* to the Assistant Postmaster General
David S. Goodson, *chief*, Air Transportation Section, Division of International Service, Post Office Department
Raymond K. Hancock, *chief*, Inquiries Section, Division of International Service, Post Office Department

Edward J. Mahoney, *chief*, International Section, Division of Postage Rates, Post Office Department
Armand J. Rioux, *chief*, International Relations Section, Division of International Service, Post Office Department

The Universal Postal Union was established in 1874. It is composed of 96 member countries. This is one of the oldest international organizations in existence today and is an outstanding example of international cooperation where there is a common objective. A former U.S. Postmaster General—Montgomery Blair, a member of Lincoln's Cabinet—was the principal promoter of the idea of establishing an international postal union. In 1863, through the efforts of Blair, a meeting was held in Paris with representatives of 15 countries in attendance; this was followed a decade later by the first Postal Con-

gress, which resulted in the establishment of the Union in 1874.

The Union is governed by the Universal Postal Convention. Its purpose is to regulate all matters relating to the movement of international mails. Congresses are held every 5 years, the last having been held at Brussels, Belgium, in 1952. Between Congresses an executive and liaison committee, composed of representatives of 20 countries, and an international bureau with headquarters at Bern, Switzerland, carry on the work of the Union. The United States has been a member of the committee for the past 10 years.

The purpose of the forthcoming Congress is to review proposed amendments to the convention and regulations which have been submitted by various members of the Union.

International Scientific Radio Union

The Department of State announced on August 14 (press release 463) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the 12th General Assembly of the International Scientific Radio Union (URSI), which will be convened at Boulder, Colo., August 22:

Harry W. Wells, *chairman*, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, D.C.

William E. Gordon, School of Electrical Engineering, Cornell University

John P. Hagen, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Department of the Navy

Millett G. Morgan, Dartmouth College

Arthur H. Waynick, Pennsylvania State University

The International Scientific Radio Union was established in 1919 and is affiliated with the International Council of Scientific Unions. Its aims are to promote international cooperation in the scientific study of radio projects. Meetings are held every 3 years, the last one being held in Amsterdam, Netherlands, August 23 to September 2, 1954.

About 900 people are expected to attend. They have been designated by the governments or URSI National Committees of the 26 member countries.

Recent discoveries in radio astronomy will be among the subjects discussed at Boulder. Many of the men responsible for these discoveries will be present. Another highlight will be a day devoted to recognition of the International Geophysics

ical Year. This part of the meeting will be presided over by Sir Edward Appleton, a former president of URSI and a Nobel Prize winner.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Security Council

Letter Dated 15 April 1957 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3812, April 16, 1957. 1 p. mimeo.

Letter Dated 19 April 1957 from the Representative of Israel Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3814, April 22, 1957. 1 p. mimeo.

Report of the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine Concerning a Complaint by Syria Under the General Armistice Agreement Between Israel and Syria. S/3815, April 23, 1957. 5 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 7 May 1957 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/3825, May 9, 1957. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 13 May 1957 to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations. S/3827, May 13, 1957. 2 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

International Law Commission. Second Report on the Law of Treaties by G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur. A/CN.4/107, March 15, 1957. 159 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Executive Committee. Report and Further Recommendations on the Problem of Hungarian Refugees. A/AC.79/73, May 8, 1957. 49 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. A/3592, June 12, 1957. Vol. I, 172 pp. mimeo.; Vol. II, 219 pp. mimeo.

Question Considered by the Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly from 4 to 10 November 1956. Note by the Secretary-General. A/3464/Add. 3, July 1, 1957. 19 pp. mimeo.

Draft Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A/3620, July 23, 1957. 12 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America. Social Aspects of Economic Development. E/CN.12/437, April 1, 1957. 9 pp. mimeo.

Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Ninth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. E/CN.4/744, April 5, 1957. 2 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. E/CN.12/444, April 8, 1957. 39 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Note by the Secretariat on the Possible Repercussions of the European Common Market on Latin American Exports. E/CN.12/449, April 20, 1957. 32 pp. mimeo.

Economic Committee. Report of the Transport and Communications Commission. E/2979, April 25, 1957. 7 pp. mimeo.

Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Thirteenth Session of the Commission on Human Rights to the

- Economic and Social Council. E/2970, E/CN.4/753, April 29, 1957. 97 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Committee. Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Report of the Economic Committee. E/2988, April 30, 1957. 8 pp. mimeo.
- Technical Assistance Committee. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Size of the Working Capital and Reserve Fund. E/TAC/59, May 6, 1957. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. E/2959, E/CN.11/454, May 6, 1957. 203 pp. mimeo.
- Technical Assistance Committee. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Status of Local Costs Arrangements. Report of the Technical Assistance Board. E/TAC/60, May 8, 1957. 8 pp. mimeo.
- Financing of Economic Development. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Question of the Establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development Prepared in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 923 (X). E/2961, May 16, 1957. 118 pp. mimeo.
- Financing of Economic Development. Supplementary Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Question of the Establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development Prepared in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1030 (XI). E/2999, May 27, 1957. 37 pp. mimeo.
- Financing of Economic Development. The International Flow of Private Capital, 1956. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3021, June 21, 1957. 72 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

Air Transport Agreement With Australia Amended

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on August 13 (press release 458) that an exchange of notes was concluded on August 12 between the Department of State and the Australian Embassy at Washington amending the Air Transport Services Agreement between the United States and Australia which was signed on December 3, 1946.¹ The amendment resulted from consultations requested by Australia, which took place in Washington from May 15 to June 14, 1957, between delegations of aviation specialists from the two countries.²

¹ 61 Stat. (3) 2464.

² For text of joint statement, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1957, p. 21.

The amendment will permit airlines designated by the United States to offer service to Sydney and Melbourne over two different routes and to offer service beyond Sydney to Asia and Europe via Darwin, to Asia and Africa via Perth, and to South America via Melbourne and a polar route. It will permit the Australian airline, Qantas Empire Airways, to extend its present service beyond San Francisco to the United Kingdom and Europe via New York. The rights granted Australia do not, however, include permission for Qantas to carry local traffic between San Francisco and New York.

The amendment also adds American Samoa and New Zealand to the list of intermediate points which may be served by the designated airlines of both countries in trans-Pacific operations.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Text of U.S. Note

AUGUST 12, 1957

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Note No. 8/57 which requested consultations pursuant to Article II of the Air Transport Services Agreement between Australia and the United States signed in Washington on December 3, 1946.

The United States Government understands that the delegations named for these consultations agreed on June 14, 1957 to refer to their respective Governments the following amendment to the aforementioned Agreement:

Article II of the Agreement and Sections I and II of the Annex to the Agreement shall be revised to read:

ARTICLE II

Each Contracting Party grants to the other Contracting Party rights necessary for the conduct of air services (hereinafter referred to as "the agreed services") by the designated airline, as follows: the rights of transit, of stops for non-traffic purposes and of commercial entry and departure for international traffic in passengers, cargo, and mail at the points in its territory named on each of the routes specified in the appropriate Section of the Annex to this Agreement.

ANNEX

Section I

The designated airline of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Australian territory at the points specified in this Section:

1. The United States via Honolulu, Canton Island, American Samoa, the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, and New Zealand to Sydney; and beyond to (a) Darwin and points in southeast Asia, including the Republic of the Philippines, and beyond; (b) Melbourne and Perth, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and beyond to points in south Asia and Africa and beyond; and (c) Melbourne and New Zealand and beyond to Antarctica and beyond.

2. The United States, including Alaska, via points in Canada, Alaska, the Kurile Islands, Japan and southeast Asia, including the Republic of the Philippines, to Sydney and Melbourne.

Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated airline be omitted on any or all flights.

Section II

The designated airline of Australia shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in United States territory at the points specified in this Section:

1. Australia via New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, American Samoa, Canton Island, Honolulu, to San Francisco and beyond to (a) Vancouver and (b) New York and beyond to points in the British Isles and beyond to Europe and beyond.

Points on any of specified routes may at the option of the designated airline be omitted on any or all flights.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the United States Government agrees to the foregoing amendment, and to suggest that if the Government of Australia agrees to the foregoing

amendment, this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an amendment of the agreement effective upon the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI

His Excellency
Sir PERCY SPENDER, K.B.E., Q.C.,
Ambassador of Australia

Text of Australian Note

AUGUST 12, 1957

SIR, I have the honor to acknowledge your note of August 12, 1957 regarding the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and Australia which reads as follows:

[At this point the Australian note repeats the U.S. note as given above.]

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia agrees to amendment of the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and Australia as set out in your note.

The Australian Government also agrees that your note and this reply shall constitute an amendment of the Agreement effective upon the date of this note.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PERCY SPENDER
Ambassador

The Honorable THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

United States and Spain Expand Atomic Energy Agreement

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 465) that the Governments of Spain and the United States on that date signed an expanded agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy which will provide a basis for future U.S. cooperation with Spain for the development of a nuclear power program. Under

the agreement the United States will make available as needed over a term of 10 years a net amount of 500 kilograms of uranium 235 to be contained in fuel sold or leased to Spain for use in research, experimental power, and power reactors.

The agreement was signed for the United States by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and John Wesley Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and for Spain by Ambassador José M. de Areilza.

The Spanish atomic energy commission, known as the Junta de Energia Nuclear, is studying plans for locating a power reactor in an industrialized area of that country. Fuel enriched up to 20 percent in U-235 would be available for such a reactor under this agreement.

The accord will enlarge the areas of cooperation between the United States and Spain in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It will authorize, for example, the transfer of gram quantities of special materials for laboratory use and, in the event that Spain decides to build a materials-testing reactor, the transfer of 6 kilograms of reactor fuel at a 90 percent enrichment in U-235.

The new agreement will come into effect when the statutory and constitutional requirements of the two nations have been fulfilled. It will supersede the U.S.-Spanish research agreement which has been in effect since July 1955.¹

Under the research accord, Spain is building a 3-megawatt pool reactor, to be located near Madrid, which is expected to be in operation by January 1958. Fuel elements for this reactor are scheduled for shipment to Spain in November 1957. On May 29, 1956, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission approved a grant of \$350,000 toward the cost of this nuclear research facility.

Spanish scientists and technicians have taken special training courses at the International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies at Oak Ridge, Tenn. Spain has also received shipments of radioisotopes from the United States. Spain was a participant in the international conference held in New York in October 1956 which approved the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3318.

Power Reactor Agreement With Germany Comes Into Effect

Press release 452 dated August 7

On August 7, the research and power agreement in the civil uses of atomic energy between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany came into effect with an exchange of notes between the Department of State and the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. This agreement was signed July 3, 1957.¹ The new accord incorporates and supersedes the atomic research agreement which has been in effect since April 23, 1956.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Convention for the promotion of inter-American cultural relations. Signed at Caracas March 28, 1954. Entered into force February 18, 1955.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

Fur Seals

Interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Signed at Washington February 9, 1957.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

Safety at Sea

Amendment of regulation 30, chapter III, annexed to the international convention for the safety of life at sea signed June 10, 1948 (inflatable liferafts). Done at London May 1955.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

Sugar

Protocol amending the international sugar agreement, with annex. Done at London December 1, 1956.

Senate advice and consent to accession given: August 8, 1957.

Trade and Commerce

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, with annex. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.³

Signature: Japan, June 17, 1957.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.³

Signature: Japan, June 17, 1957.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.³

Signature: Japan, June 17, 1957.

¹ BULLETIN of July 22, 1957, p. 147.

² Not in force for United States.

³ Not in force.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.³

Signature: Japan, June 17, 1957.

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the general agreement, and the protocol of organizational amendments to the general agreement. Done at Geneva, December 3, 1955.³

Signature: Japan, June 17, 1957.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively. *Ratification deposited:* Brazil, June 29, 1957.

Whaling

Protocol amending the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington November 19, 1956.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of December 3, 1946 (TIAS 1574). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 12, 1957. Entered into force August 12, 1957.

Agreement for cooperation regarding atomic information for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington July 12, 1957.

Entered into force: August 14, 1957 (date on which each Government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Austria

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington October 25, 1956.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

Agreement relating to the purchase by Austria of military equipment, materials, and services for internal security and legitimate self-defense. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 9, 1957. Entered into force August 9, 1957.

Canada

Convention further modifying and supplementing the convention and accompanying protocol of March 4, 1942 (56 Stat. 1399), as modified June 12, 1950 (TIAS 2347) for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion in income taxes. Signed at Ottawa August 8, 1956.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

September 2, 1957

Egypt

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of June 15, 1946 (TIAS 1727). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 24 and July 31, 1957. Entered into force July 31, 1957.

Japan

Protocol supplementing the convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income of April 16, 1954 (TIAS 3176). Signed at Tokyo March 23, 1957.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

Korea

Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, with protocol. Signed at Seoul November 28, 1956.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: August 8, 1957.

Panama

Agreement authorizing inspection by Panamanian nautical inspectors of vessels of Panamanian registry in the Canal Zone. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama August 5, 1957. Entered into force August 5, 1957.

Poland

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of June 7, 1957 (TIAS 3839). Signed at Washington August 14, 1957. Entered into force August 14, 1957.

Spain

Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy, and superseding the research reactor agreement of July 19, 1955 (TIAS 3318). Signed at Washington August 16, 1957. Enters into force on date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

PUBLICATIONS

German War Documents Released

The Department of State announced on July 31 (press release 433 dated July 24) the release of *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume X, The War Years, June 23-August 31, 1940*. This is the 10th volume in the series being published cooperatively by the United States, Great Britain, and France from archives of the German Foreign Office captured by Allied forces at the close of World War II.

The volume begins on June 23, 1940, the day after the signing of the French armistice with Germany. It ends on August 31, 1940, with the conclusion of the Vienna Award, whereby Hitler

and Mussolini imposed a territorial settlement between Rumania on the one hand and Hungary and Bulgaria on the other.

The documents are printed in chronological order. There is a descriptive list of documents arranged by topics to guide those who may wish to read on particular subjects.

As is customary in this series, the selection of documents has been made jointly by the British, French, and United States editors, who share responsibility for the selections made. Under a reciprocal arrangement some of the volumes are edited and printed by the British and some by the U.S. Government. This volume has been edited by the U.S. editors and printed at the Government Printing Office. A British edition bound from flat sheets printed at the Government Printing Office is being released simultaneously with the U.S. edition.

Copies of the volume, which has the publication number 6491, can be obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$2.75 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

When You Go Abroad—Information for Bearers of Passports. Pub. 6485. Department and Foreign Service Series 66. 103 pp. 35¢.

A pamphlet containing valuable information for any American citizen who plans to travel abroad.

Army Mission. TIAS 3821. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru, amending agreement of September 6, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima April 8 and 24, 1957. Entered into force April 24, 1957.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program at Lima. TIAS 3823. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima April 17, 1957. Entered into force May 17, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3824. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Austria—Signed at Vienna May 10, 1957, with related note. Entered into force May 10, 1957, with related note.

Emergency Relief for Hungarians in Austria. TIAS 3825. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Austria. Exchange of notes—Signed at Vienna May 10, 1957. Entered into force May 10, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3826. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Finland—Signed at Helsinki May 10, 1957, with related exchange of notes. Entered into force May 10, 1957, with related exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3827. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru—Signed at Lima May 2, 1957, with related exchange of notes. Entered into force May 2, 1957, with related exchange of notes.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3830. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Australia—Signed at Washington June 22, 1956. Entered into force May 28, 1957.

Mutual Security—Investment Guaranties. TIAS 3831. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and China, amending agreement of June 25, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei May 3, 1957. Entered into force May 3, 1957.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 3832. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Luxembourg, amending annex B of the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Luxembourg April 15 and 25, 1957. Entered into force April 25, 1957.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program at Guayaquil. TIAS 3833. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito April 24, 1957. Entered into force May 14, 1957.

Mutual Aid Settlement. TIAS 3834. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, relating to joint statement of December 6, 1945, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 24 and 25, 1957. Entered into force April 25, 1957.

Economic Assistance. TIAS 3835. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Iraq. Exchange of notes—Signed at Baghdad May 18 and 22, 1957. Entered into force May 22, 1957.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3836. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Norway—Signed at Washington February 25, 1957. Entered into force June 10, 1957.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 12-18

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Press releases issued prior to August 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 224 of April 19, 433 of July 24, and 452 of August 7.

No.	Date	Subject
455	8/12	Jones: Canadian Friendship Day.
456	8/12	Delegation to Dominican presidential inauguration.
457	8/12	Delegation to Universal Postal Union (rewrite).
458	8/13	Air transport agreement with Australia amended.
459	8/13	U.S. protests U.S.S.R. closing of Peter the Great Bay.
460	8/13	Herter: message to Americans contemplating travel to Communist China.
†461	8/14	Supplemental agricultural commodities agreement with Poland.
462	8/14	U.S. protests Syrian actions.
463	8/14	Delegation to International Scientific Radio Union (rewrite).
464	8/15	Note to Canada on handling of security information.
465	8/16	U.S., Spain expand atomic energy agreement.
*466	8/16	Educational exchange.
467	8/16	Exchange of radio-TV broadcasts with U.S.S.R.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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United States Policy in the Middle East

September 1956-June 1957

Documents

During the past year the United States was presented with most difficult and critical problems in the Middle East. In a volume issued last October, *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication*, the Department of State presented documents, including some background material, which covered the first 2 months of the controversy that stemmed from President Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal Company. The present volume, covering the period from September 1956 to June 1957, carries the story forward; presents the highlights of other major developments in the Middle East, including the hostilities in Egypt; and shows not only how the United States reacted to these developments, but also how important new elements were added to American policy toward the Middle East in general.

Copies of *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957: Documents* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$1.50 each.

Publication 6505

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